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We extend our prior work on how both supply (including the emergence of
OTC equity derivatives and growth in share lending) and demand (including
the growth of hedge funds) factors now facilitate the large-scale, low-cost decoup-
ling of shareholder voting rights from shareholder economic interests. Both in-
side and outside shareholders, as well as corporations themselves, can engage in
what we termed "empty voting"--voting while holding greater voting power
than economic ownership. Shareholders can also have "hidden (morphable)
ownership "-economic ownership, ostensibly without voting rights, which re-
mains undisclosed under current disclosure rules, but can quickly morph to in-
clude voting ownership as well. These forms of decoupling pose important risks
to the one-share-one-vote paradigm that underlies conventional models of corpo-
rate governance and shareholder voting.
We extend our prior work in five primary ways. First, we treat decoupling
of voting rights from economic ownership of shares (empty voting and hidden
ownership) as special instances of a more general pattern-investors, and cor-
porations themselves, can unbundle the package of rights and obligations which
have traditionally been associated with equity ("equity decoupling") as well as
debt ("debt decoupling"). Second, we provide evidence that equity decoupling
is an important worldwide phenomenon, which adds urgency to the need for
disclosure and perhaps other reforms. Third, we go beyond decoupling by
shareholders, examine decoupling strategies that corporations can use to fend
off changes in control, and expand our integrated equity ownership disclosure
proposal to address corporate decoupling. Fourth, we propose responses to
empty voting which go beyond disclosure, including constrained corporate
power to limit the voting rights of empty voters, condensing the period from re-
cord date to shareholder meeting date, and encouraging institutional investors
to recall and vote lent shares. Fifth, we sketch several extensions of our decoup-
ling framework to (a) the full range of shareholder rights and obligations, (b)
debt decoupling, and (c) the possible revival of the "street sweep" takeover strategy.
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INTRODUCTION
Ownership of shares customarily conveys economic, voting, and
other rights and disclosure and other obligations. Longstanding legal
and economic theories of the public corporation assume that the ele-
ments of this package of rights and obligations cannot readily be de-
coupled-and in particular that voting rights cannot be decoupled
from an economic interest in the corporation. The "one-share-one-
vote" pattern, with voting rights held in proportion to economic inter-
est, is a familiar instance of this assumption.
This foundational assumption can no longer be relied on. In
prior work, we explored the implications of decoupling of voting
rights from economic ownership and the resulting gaps in disclosure
rules (collectively, Decoupling I).1 We explored why decoupling of vot-
We developed the concepts of empty voting and hidden (morphable) owner-
ship in several recent, related articles. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811
(2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version)], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=904004 (article directed at legal academics); Henry T. C. Hu
& Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implica-
tions, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=887183 (shorter version, directed at lawyers, judges, and regulators); Henry T.
C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007)
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ing rights from economic interest is increasingly a matter of choice.
The emergence of equity swaps and other over-the-counter (OTC)
equity derivatives, the growth of lightly regulated hedge funds, related
growth in the share lending market, and other factors now permit de-
coupling of voting rights from economic interest to occur quickly, at
low cost, on a large scale, and often hidden from view. Investors can
have greater voting than economic ownership, a pattern we termed
"empty voting." Conversely, investors can have greater economic than
voting ownership, which under current rules often allows them to
avoid public disclosure of their ownership. Often, this hidden eco-
nomic ownership can be quickly transformed to include voting owner-
ship as well, a combination we termed "hidden (morphable) owner-
ship." We referred to empty voting and hidden (morphable)
ownership together as the "new vote buying." We set out the func-
tional elements of these two forms of decoupling, provided a taxon-
omy of decoupling strategies, described the legal and regulatory envi-
ronment, proposed enhanced shareholder disclosure of both
economic and voting ownership, and sketched possible additional re-
sponses to empty voting.
In this Article, we reexamine and extend our prior work in light of
new developments, which show the real-world significance of these
decoupling strategies, illustrate uses beyond those we had anticipated,
and confirm the urgency of a disclosure-based response. We also pro-
pose additional regulatory responses to empty voting.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I offers an overview of
decoupling strategies and uses. We embed empty voting and hidden
(morphable) ownership in a new general framework, in which the
separation of economic and voting rights is one instance of the
broader ability of investors to unbundle much of the package of
rights and obligations customarily associated with share ownership.
In our prior work, we focused on decoupling by shareholders. Here,
we also add decoupling by corporations to an overall family of "eq-
uity decoupling" strategies. The firm cannot vote its own shares.
But the firm's managers can often use decoupling strategies to ar-
range for friendly shareholders to hold votes but limited or no eco-
nomic rights, where the shareholders are expected to support man-
agement, and have incentives to do so, or at least no incentives to
[hereinafter Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Finance Version)], nearfinal version available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=874098 (version directed at finance academics, with ex-
panded theoretical discussion). Below, we refer where appropriate to the first article
and, in some cases, the third, but assume general familiarity with this prior work.
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vote against management. In one recent takeover battle, for exam-
ple, a Hungarian firm repurchased 40% of its own shares and lent
the shares to friendly banks (thus transferring voting rights but not
economic risk). One might call the strategy "soft parking" of shares
(we define this term more carefully below). OTC equity derivatives
offer other options for the firm to place votes but little or no eco-
nomic risk with friendly third parties. Employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs) and restricted stock plans place votes, with only lim-
ited economic ownership, in friendly hands. And acquirers can be
empty voters of target shares, or vice versa. We also develop the uses
of decoupling to avoid a number of regulatory requirements, notjust
ownership disclosure.
A recurring response to DecouplingIfrom U.S. readers was, "This is
interesting, but is it important?" Part II provides fresh evidence. We
can now say unequivocally that equity decoupling is an important
worldwide phenomenon. Some recent examples have been dramatic,
including stealth takeover attempts relying on hidden (morphable)
ownership strategies. The managers and shareholders of major firms
have woken up one morning to learn that their company suddenly has
a new 30% or 40% shareholder.
In Switzerland, decoupling has been the stuff of front page head-
lines, involving the acquisition of controlling stakes in several lead-
ing Swiss firms, the resignation of the CEO of a major Swiss bank for
facilitating this hidden ownership, and rapid government responses.
Nothing in current U.S. rules prevents similar stealth bids here. Poi-
son pills may do so, but their existence in perhaps half of our major
public firms will not help the other half, nor justify regulatory com-
placency.
More broadly, our list of decoupling examples worldwide (see Part
II and Table 1, infra) has grown-from 21 in 2006 to over 80 today, in
over 20 countries. Some of the new examples are disquieting. More-
over, our prior examples primarily involved hedge funds and other
outside shareholders. A number of the new examples involve corpo-
rate decoupling. These examples confirm the importance of insider
and corporate decoupling.
In Part III, we refine our earlier integrated ownership disclosure
reform proposal to respond to the newly emerging forms of decoup-
ling, especially corporate decoupling, and to expand disclosure of
share lending. We also argue that the emergence of sneak takeover
attacks in Europe, which could be replicated here, makes disclosure
reform urgent. At present, the Securities and Exchange Commission
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(SEC) is known to be considering disclosure reforms, but no public
proposal has been made. We also review evidence from the U.K.,
which in 2005 revised its rules for disclosure during takeover bids, and
has recently proposed additional disclosure more broadly. The U.K
experience suggests that decoupling around takeover bids is reasona-
bly common, that a disclosure-based response can provide valuable in-
formation on its extent, and that disclosure is not very burdensome to
filers. Even hedge funds may be coming to believe that derivatives-
based ownership should be disclosed. In October 2007, a group of 14
of London's biggest hedge funds called for European regulators to
require this disclosure .
Part IV discusses responses that go beyond disclosure, which we
believe should be implemented in the near- to medium-term. In our
prior work, we sketched possible approaches but believed it was pre-
mature to propose specific measures. We now propose that corporate
law should allow firms to adopt charter amendments to limit empty
voting, subject to an array of limits designed to ensure that these
amendments produce better voting, rather than voting tilted toward
insiders. We present a specific example of a charter amendment, un-
der which large shareholders could attest to non-empty voter status.
We also recommend revising current record date practices to better
connect votes to economic ownership, make empty voting more diffi-
cult, and address "overvoting" (a practice that, despite its name, often
results in valid votes not being counted). And we propose measures to
encourage institutional investors to vote shares for which they have
economic ownership.
Part V briefly outlines three extensions of our analytical frame-
work. First, we extend the concept of decoupling to the full range of
rights and obligations customarily associated with share ownership-
call this "equity decoupling." The relevant rights include not only vot-
ing rights, but also rights relating to appraisal, directors' fiduciary du-
ties, bringing lawsuits, shareholder proposals, and inspection of cor-
porate records. The relevant obligations include not only disclosure
but also, depending on each state's or country's laws, antitakeover
laws, mandatory bid requirements, antitrust approval, holding com-
pany or investment company status, and short-swing profit recapture.
Second, equity decoupling has a close companion in debt markets-
call this "debt decoupling." Creditors can use credit derivatives and
other means to decouple exposure to default risk from control and
2 See infra Part II1.B.
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other rights under loan agreements and bankruptcy law. Corpora-
tions may thus have "empty creditors" as well as empty voters, "hidden
debt ownership" as well as hidden equity ownership, and perhaps
morphable debt ownership as well.3 Third, decoupling facilitates the
reemergence of a takeover technique-the "street sweep"-which ap-
peared briefly in the 1980s, threatened to undermine U.S. tender of-
fer regulation, and then disappeared when the poison pill defense
emerged. This pattern-"the new street sweep"-has already oc-
curred in Europe.
Part VI concludes. A related finance-oriented paper offers a more
systematic and extended analysis of debt decoupling and introduces
hybrid debt-equity decoupling.4
I. SHAREHOLDER AND CORPORATE DECOUPLING
A. Decoupling: Overall Picture
At the core of the governance of the publicly held corporation is
the shareholder vote. That governance, for the vast majority of com-
panies, is based on a proportional relationship between voting power
and economic ownership: one share, one vote.
The linkage of voting rights and economic interest serves several
goals. It places the power to oversee company managers with those
who have an incentive to exercise that power to increase firm value.
The more shares owned, the greater the incentive and thus the
greater the number of votes. Beyond the instrumental role of voting,
the concept of shareholder-as-owner-and-voter is a core ideological
3 The extensions of the decoupling framework to other shareholder rights and to
decoupling by creditors were introduced in Henry T. C. Hu, Shareholder and Creditor
Decoupling: Separating "Embedded Rights" and Contractual Rights from Economic Interests 1,
4, 20-21, 23 (10th Singapore Conference on International Business Law, Aug. 22-23,
2007) (Aug. 17, 2007 draft, on file with authors) [hereinafter Hu, Shareholder and Credi-
tor Decoupling], and subsequently discussed in Henry T. C. Hu &Jay L. Westbrook, Abo-
lition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1329-30, 1366, 1382-89,
1395-98, 1401-03 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Westbrook, Shareholder and Creditor Inter-
ests], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=977582.
4 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084075 [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid
Decoupling).
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basis for managerial exercise of authority over property the managers
do not own.
This linkage also underlies most regulation of the rights and obli-
gations of shareholders. With limited exceptions, the rules governing
public firms-including state and federal corporate, securities, and
other laws, federal securities rules, and stock exchange rules (collec-
tively, "corporate governance rules")-presume that ownership of
shares is a meaningful concept and conveys a standard package of
shareholder rights. Some of these rights are directly economic, in-
cluding dividend, liquidation, and appraisal rights under corporate
law, and gain (loss) from an increase (decrease) in trading prices. We
call this package of rights "economic ownership." Some rights are not
purely monetary, including voting rights, director fiduciary duties,
rights to bring suits and inspect corporate records, and so on. The
special case of record ownership of shares by banks and broker-dealers
is handled by obscure rules governing record owners, which partly re-
connects economic rights with voting and other rights. Some corpo-
rate governance rules are based on formal record ownership; some are
based on who holds voting rights. However, most of these rules regu-
late, lightly or not at all, persons who have economic ownership but
not voting rights.
Over the course of the last century, all this sort of worked. The
underlying assumption of a linked set of economic, voting, and other
rights ("full ownership") was mostly satisfied. The special rules for re-
cord owners sort of handled the most important exception. When
gaps appeared, as they sometimes did, perhaps a tinkering fix was ap-
plied, or perhaps the breakdown was simply ignored.
This underlying assumption works no longer. The derivatives
revolution in finance, the growth of sophisticated, lightly regulated
hedge funds, and the related growth in the share lending market now
make it easy to decouple voting rights from economic ownership.
Economic ownership can be further decomposed. For instance, ap-
praisal and dividend rights can be decoupled from other economic
rights. Other types of equity decoupling are possible as well, if the
need arises. We focus here on the decoupling of voting rights from
We seek throughout this Article to limit overlap with Decouplingl. We indicate in
occasional footnotes, including this one, where to find further discussion of points ad-
dressed there. Unless there is specific need, we do not repeat citations that appear
there or decoupling examples discussed there. On the goals served by linking voting
and economic rights, see Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra
note 1, at 850-54.
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economic ownership. We return to other types of equity decoupling
in Part V.A.
One concern raised by decoupling is that an investor can have a
large voting stake, yet a zero or even negative stake in the company's
welfare. In March 2006, for example, Multi-Fineline Electronix (M-
Flex), a Delaware company, offered to buy a Singapore company, MFS
Technologies (MFS) . WBL, another Singapore company, owns a ma-
jority stake in both M-Flex and MFS. Under M-Flex's charter, the offer
required approval both by a majority of all shares and by a majority of
M-Flex's minority shareholders. M-Flex set up a special committee to
consider whether the acquisition was good for M-Flex's minority
shareholders; the committee decided it was not and recommended
that the minority shareholders vote against the acquisition. M-Flex
then sued WBL, seeking to compel WBL to vote against the acquisi-
tion based on WBL's fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder. M-
Flex claimed that this was necessary because Stark, a hedge fund, held
at least 48% of the minority M-Flex shares and had an incentive to
vote for the offer even if it was bad for M-Flex. Stark owned a large
stake in the target, MFS, and had hedged most or all of its interest in
M-Flex. It would therefore be happy if M-Flex overpaid for MFS.
In the terminology we developed in Decoupling I (terms defined
there are in italics), Stark had voting ownership of M-Flex shares, but
zero (or nearly zero) economic ownership. Stark was thus engaged in
empty voting: its shares had voting rights, but had been emptied of the
economic ownership that customarily accompanies those rights. In-
6 This discussion is based primarily on the M-Flex complaint against WBL, in the
Delaware Court of Chancery, and a court order in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California dismissing a different M-Flex complaint against Stark.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc. v.
WBL Corp., No. 2482-N, 2006 WL 4781677 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2006); Order Granting
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Multi-Fineline Elec-
tronix, Inc. v. Stark Master Fund Ltd., No. 06-0960 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2006). We have
assumed that M-Flex's factual allegations are correct. For subsequent developments,
see Sarah Tolkoff, Freed from Deal, M-Flex Seeks To Diversify, ORANGE COUNTY BUS. J.,
July 2, 2007, at 3 (describing M-Flex's future after WBL shareholders voted against
the merger with M-Flex); and Multi-Fineline Announces WBL Shareholders Vote Against
Accepting the MFS Technology Offer, REUTERS, June 26, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/inPlayBriefing/idUSIN20070626083553MFLX20070626
(discussing the WBL shareholder vote against the merger).
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deed, including its position in MFS, Stark likely had a negative overall
economic interest in M-Flex, and would gain if M-Flex overpaid for MFS.7
The opposite pattern is also common-investors can use cash-
settled equity swaps and other cash-settled equity derivatives to obtain
economic ownership without voting rights (call these "economic only"
positions). A central reason for doing this is that large shareholder
ownership disclosure requirements are usually based on voting owner-
ship; physically settled derivatives, which convey rights to obtain
shares, might count, but economic ownership through cash-settled de-
rivatives generally does not count. By shedding voting rights, hedge
funds and other outside investors can avoid disclosing their positions.8
These economic-only positions thus result in hidden ownership-
economic ownership that is not disclosed, even though it would be
disclosed if held directly through shares.9
Equity swaps and other OTC derivatives-individually negotiated,
customized contracts typically entered into by investors with deriva-
tives dealers-offer opportunities that go beyond merely creating
economic-only ownership.' They also make possible morphable vot-
ing ownership. Assume that an investor takes the long side of an eq-
uity swap, and thus receives the economic return on shares from the
dealer, who takes the short side. The dealer will typically hedge its
exposure, often by holding "matched shares," so that gain (loss) on
the matched shares offsets loss (gain) on the equity swap. Without
more, the dealer is now an empty voter-it has voting rights but no
economic interest. The investor is, let us assume, a hidden owner-
putting aside the potential for morphable voting rights, it has eco-
nomic-only ownership, no voting rights, and thus generally no disclo-
sure obligation.
Suppose now that the investor later wants to vote. Under common
market practices, it can usually return to the dealer, unwind the swap,
obtain the matched shares, and, presto, the investor has voting rights
to accompany its economic ownership. Or perhaps, as sometimes oc-
7 Readers familiar with Decoupling I will recognize that the M-Flex/Stark/MFS pat-
tern here is closely analogous to the Mylan/Perry/King Pharmaceuticals pattern dis-
cussed there.
8 We discuss the disclosure requirements for cash-settled derivatives in Hu &
Black, Decouplingl (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 864-75.
9 References in the remainder of this Article to equity swaps and other equity de-
rivatives are to cash-settled derivatives, unless otherwise specified.
10 As to the distinction between exchange-traded derivatives and OTC derivatives,
see Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1457, 1464-65 (1993).
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curs in the U.K, the investor can ask the dealer to vote as it would
have voted. In Decoupling I, we called the combination of hidden own-
ership and likely informal ability to obtain voting rights "hidden
(morphable) ownership." Both hidden and disclosed economic-only
ownership may convey informal, morphable voting rights.
If the investor had clear rights to unwind the swap and obtain
shares, or to instruct the dealer on how to vote, the investor would be
considered to have voting rights under Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) section 13(d)," and would have to disclose own-
ership on Schedule 13D.' 2 But as long as the investor's voting rights
are implicit and not enforceable, current practice generally supports
nondisclosure.
Hedge funds and other outside investors can use hidden owner-
ship to build up large, otherwise disclosable positions, yet disclose
their ownership only when they are ready. For example, in May 2007,
hedge funds SAC Capital Advisors and Jana Partners claimed they
were TD Ameritrade's largest economic owners, with a combined
8.4% economic interest-without making any public filings.' 3 Atticus
Capital, another prominent hedge fund, told the Wall Street Journal
that it routinely uses derivatives in order to avoid disclosure, which
would tip off competitors to its activities.' 4 Atticus used equity swaps
and other OTC derivatives to acquire large stakes in Phelps Dodge in
2006 and Freeport-McMoran in 2007.'
5
B. Functional Elements and Terminology
Because of the many ways in which decoupling can occur, it is use-
ful to set out its functional elements and specify some terminology.
We do so here, while being intentionally brief for elements described
in Decoupling I. By "formal voting rights," we refer to the legal right to
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
12 For the classic case involving disclosable hard stock parking, see United States v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991). For an account of how stock parking was used
in the 1980s, see CONNIE BRUcK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THEJUNK-BOND RAIDERS AND
THE MAN WHO STAKED THEM 320-29 (1988).
13 Our discussion of TD Ameritrade is based on Gaston F. Ceron, Ameritrade Gets
Pressure from Funds for a Merger, WALL ST.J.,June 6, 2007, at C3; Kaja Whitehouse, David
Enrich & Mara Lemos Stein, Activist Hedge Funds Use Derivatives To Target Larger Prey,
DowJONES NEWS WIRES, July 11, 2007; and TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (June 5, 2007).
14 Gregory Zuckerman, Concentration Proves Winner at Hedge Fund, WALL ST.J., May
14, 2007, at Cl.
15 Id.; Whitehouse, Enrich & Stein (2007), supra note 13.
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vote shares under company law (as supplemented by rules governing
voting of shares held by record owners in "street name"), including
the legal power to instruct someone else how to vote. Thus, in the
common situation where a broker holds shares in street name for a
customer, the customer has formal voting rights because it has the
right under stock exchange rules to instruct the broker how to vote
the customer's shares. By "voting rights" or "voting ownership" of
shares, we refer to either formal or informal rights to vote shares, in-
cluding the de facto power to instruct someone else how to vote. The
company at which voting takes place is the "host company."
By "economic ownership," we will generally refer to the economic
returns associated with shares. Strictly speaking, economic ownershipS 16
includes related rights, such as those associated with appraisal. This
ownership can be achieved directly by holding shares. Appraisal and
other related rights aside, economic ownership can also be achieved
indirectly by holding a "coupled asset" that conveys returns that relate
directly to those on the shares. Economic ownership can be either
positive (the same direction as the return on shares), or negative (the
opposite direction from the return on shares).
Someone who owns voting shares has "full ownership": he has all
of the rights and obligations associated with shares, including voting
rights and economic rights. Putting aside the other rights we discuss
in Part V, one can think of full ownership as consisting of voting own-
ership plus direct economic ownership. But it is also possible to de-
couple these two rights and have voting-only ownership or economic-
only ownership. Economic-only ownership may or may not be hidden
(i.e., exempt from the disclosure rules that would apply to full owner-
ship, and not voluntarily disclosed), and may or may not be accompa-
nied by morphable voting rights. 17
Decoupling voting and economic rights often depends on com-
bining full ownership of shares with ownership of a coupled asset.
Coupled assets include derivatives (such as options, futures, and eq-
16 See infra Part V.A. Nothing in the framework presumes that shareholder rights
in general-or shareholder economic rights-are limited to those that would be pos-
sessed by a residual claimant. For discussion of the limitations of the "residual claim-
ant" notion in characterizing shareholder rights, see Hu & Westbrook, Shareholder and
Creditor Interests (2007), supra note 3, at 1382-89, 1393-98.
17 Economic-only ownership, accompanied by morphable voting rights, is not truly
"economic-only." We judged that this imprecision did not justify creating yet another
term for this type of ownership, which would fall in between economic-only and full
ownership.
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uity swaps), contractual rights (such as rights under a share loan
agreement), and other financial products, which convey an economic
return that relates directly to the return on shares. The coupled asset
affects economic ownership, but leaves voting rights unchanged. In
principle, one could also decouple voting and economic rights by
holding shares and having a side contract relating to the votes, but this
is not common in practice. By "net economic ownership," we refer to
a person's combined economic ownership, based on both host shares
and coupled assets. The level of net economic ownership may depend
on share price. For example, if a company's shares trade at $50, and
an executive has a collar that caps upside at $60 and downside at $45,
the option "deltas" (and thus the executive's economic exposure to
share price changes) depend on share price.
We refer to anyone who has substantially greater voting than eco-
nomic ownership as an "empty voter." Voting can be partially or fully
empty. For example, an executive who hedges economic exposure to
the company's shares with a zero-cost collar will often be-depending
on the executive's securities and stock option holdings-a partially
empty owner. We similarly refer to anyone who has substantially
greater economic than voting ownership, where that extra ownership
falls outside ownership disclosure rules, as a "hidden owner." If the
hidden owner likely has effective access to voting rights when needed,
he has "hidden (morphable) ownership."
Hidden (morphable) ownership can also be seen as one form of
"soft parking" of shares: shares held in friendly hands to avoid regula-
tory or other burdens of direct ownership, yet providing access to the
desired shareholder rights. Here is a soft definition of soft parking of
shares. One party (the "parkee") holds shares and thus apparent vot-
ing rights, but limited or no economic ownership. The parkee is in-
formally expected to either (1) vote as another party (the "parker")
would want, or informally requests, or (2) arrange, if the parker re-
quests, to unwind the parking transaction and return the voting rights
to the parker. The parkee will often be a derivatives dealer or bank.
The parker could be an outside shareholder, an insider, or a corpora-
tion. If a corporation or its insiders are the parker, the parked shares
will often be the corporation's own shares, but could be shares of a
subsidiary or transaction counterparty. Economic ownership corre-
sponding to the parked shares will often but not always reside with the
parker. In corporate decoupling, for example, the company may have
effectively repurchased its own shares; there will then be no true eco-
nomic owner.
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Soft parking can serve a number of purposes, including: (1) let-
ting the parker avoid disclosure of economic ownership, voting own-
ership, or both; (2) especially for corporate decoupling, ensuring that
shares retain voting rights, which they might lose in the parker's
hands; (3) avoiding other regulatory requirements, such as mandatory
bid rules; and (4) tax arbitrage, if dividends or other cash flows on
shares are more lightly taxed for the parkee than for the parker. Its
boundaries are fuzzy. As informal expectations on how the parkee will
act become firmer, and potentially enforceable, soft parking shades
into hard. As the parkee's economic ownership increases, the parking
analogy loses it force.
Investors may also hold "related non-host assets"-assets, often se-
curities of another company, whose value is related to the value of the
host company's shares. For example, if the host company plans to ac-
quire a target in a share-for-share merger with a fixed exchange ratio,
the target's shares are a related non-host asset. The combined return
from host shares, coupled assets, and related non-host assets produces
an "overall economic interest" in taking actions that affect firm value,
which can be positive, zero, or negative.
Empty voting, as we have defined it, includes some longstanding
arrangements for concentrating voting power. These include dual-
class capital structures, with one class holding greater voting power
relative to economic rights, and pyramids and circular ownership
structures, which concentrate effective voting control in the hands of
the person, family, or group at the top of the pyramid or the "center"
of the circular ownership structure. The implications and regulation
of these techniques are beyond the scope of this Article.'
More subtly, one might see proxy voting advisors, such as Institu-
tional Shareholder Services (ISS), as empty voters as well. These advi-
sory services have no direct economic interest in shares, yet wield sub-
stantial voting power through their advice to institutional investors.
Voting advisors may also have conflicts of interest (e.g., ISS and its af-
filiates sell services to both investors and companies). ISS's advice
reaches investors controlling $25 trillion in equities, and about 25% of
those investors routinely cast their votes according to ISS guidelines.
Case-by-case exceptions are possible but not common.' 9 Thus, ISS and
18 We discuss these techniques in Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version)
(2006), supra note 1, at 858-59.
19 Joe Bacchus, Rockville-Based Corporate Governance Firm To Merge with RiskMetrics,
DAILY REcORD (Baltimore), Nov. 2, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19183261; Robert D.
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other voting advisors, as a practical matter, have significant voting
ownership, but no economic ownership. But they are empty voters
only at the sufferance of their principals. Analysis of ISS and other
voting advisors as empty voters is also beyond our scope.
C. Shareholder Rights: Empty Voting
1. Hedge Funds and Other Shareholders
Hedge funds and other outside shareholders largely accomplish
empty voting through the use of coupled assets (such as equity deriva-
tives or stock loan agreements), as well as through related non-host
assets. Since we have detailed these strategies in Decoupling I, we touch
on their mechanics only lightly.
One core strategy for empty voting is to hold shares but hedge the
economic return on the shares, such as through a short equity swap
position, buying put options (or selling call options), or a short posi-
tion on a single stock future. Absent a major change in doctrine, the
strategy of equity derivatives as coupled assets would not run afoul of
corporate law rules limiting vote buying.
Corporate law seeks to limit the decoupling of economic interest
and voting power through the classic common law prohibition on
"vote buying," defined to be the transfer of a shareholder's voting
rights, shorn of empty economic interest, to a third party. 2° The cur-
rent Delaware attitude is more tolerant. In the leading 1982 case of
21Schreiber v. Carney, the court held that each vote buying arrangement
"must be examined in light of its object or purpose";22 vote buying was
permitted if it satisfied a test for intrinsic fairness.2' As under the
common law, Delaware considers vote buying to involve a vote seller
who transfers the voting rights to a vote buyer.
24
Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006,
§ 3, at 6.
20 See, e.g., Chew v. Inverness Mgmt. Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976) (prohibit-
ing transfer of voting rights); Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776 (1979) (discussing vote buying law and policy implications);
Michael D. Schmitz, Comment, Shareholder Vote Buying-A Rebuttable Presumption of Ille-
gality, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 927 (same).
21 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
22 Id. at 25.
23 Id. at 26.
24 More specifically, Schreiber defines vote buying as "a voting agreement supported
by consideration personal to the stockholder, whereby the stockholder divorces his dis-
cretionary voting power and votes as directed by the offeror." Id. at 23.
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A new vote buyer using equity derivatives can acquire voting rights
through a two-step process in which neither step involves a transfer of
voting rights: first, purchase shares; and second, shed the economic in-
terests associated with those shares. The share purchaser is left hold-
ing only the voting rights associated with the shares.
Consider the Stark/M-Flex situation. Stark purchased M-Flex
shares and entered into equity derivatives, which hedged its economic
exposure. Neither step involved either a vote seller or a transfer of
voting rights. Instead, these transactions involved a share purchaser
and a transfer of economic interests. The decoupling is achieved by two
normal market transactions-a share purchase and a hedging transac-
tion-rather than a single suspect purchase of votes.
An alternate empty voting strategy is known as record date cap-
ture. (Below, we refer to the voting record date simply as the "record
date," except when we need to distinguish the voting record date from
the dividend record date.) This strategy involves borrowing shares in
the stock loan market just before the record date and returning the
shares immediately afterwards. Under standard borrowing arrange-
ments, the borrower has no economic exposure to the company. The
borrower contracts with the share lender to (1) return the shares to
the lender at any time at the election of either side, and (2) pay the
lender an amount equal to any dividends or other distributions the
borrower receives on the shares. Taxes aside, this loan agreement (a
"coupled asset" in our framework) leaves the borrower holding votes
without economic ownership, while the lender has economic owner-
ship without votes.
Stock borrowings originally developed to facilitate short selling.
The borrower sells the borrowed shares and ends up with negative
economic ownership and no voting rights. The buyer of the sold-short
shares has full ownership; the share lender has economic-only owner-
ship. Decoupling still exists, but there is no empty voter. But omit the
short sale, and stock borrowing becomes a vehicle for empty voting.25
A subtle yet central aspect of these empty voting strategies is that
they do not directly require market trading of shares. Thus, they can
often be carried out, rapidly and on a large scale, with little impact on
share price. Consider the share borrowing strategy. The empty voter
borrows shares, and votes simply move from the share lender to the
empty voter. No shares are bought or sold. This strategy will affect
25 As discussed infta in Part IV.C, there are bank regulatory and other limitations
on borrowing shares for voting purposes in certain circumstances.
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the shares' trading only if the borrowing is on a scale which affects the
ability of short-sellers or hedgers to ply their trade. More complex al-
ternatives can also produce little or no direct impact on share trading.
Consider the strategy (buy shares, hedge with equity swaps). An
empty voter can buy shares from a dealer and simultaneously take the
short side of an equity swap with the same dealer. The dealer will
want to hedge. A direct way to do so is to borrow the shares (with no
share trading) at the same time it creates the swap. The empty voter
ends up with hedged share ownership, the dealer is hedged as well,
and votes have again moved from the share lender to the empty voter,
without either the investor or the dealer having bought or sold any
shares. The equity swap transaction itself is private and undisclosed.
The borrowing directly affects the share lending market, but for
most companies, at most times, this market includes a large pool of
borrowable shares, available at a quite modest price, on the order of
2620 basis points per year. One constraint on the scale of these ap-
proaches is the number of shares that can be readily borrowed. Hard
numbers are not available, but a conservative estimate is that for most
large U.S. public companies, at most times, 20% or more of the out-
standing shares can be readily borrowed. 7
Empty voters can, of course, trade shares between the record and
voting dates. In some cases, their voting position will let them profit
from this trading. Efforts to model the efficiency properties of empty
voting are only beginning, but one recent model suggests that this
ability to trade can sometimes be efficiency enhancing, and sometimes
28not.
2. Soft Parking by the Corporation Itself
In Decoupling I, we discussed how both outside and inside share-
holders can engage in empty voting. Two of our examples involved
corporations themselves doing so, but we did not analyze this system-
atically. In hindsight, we should have done so. In fact, corporations
can use decoupling techniques to allow insiders or other friendly third
parties to vote shares with partial or no economic exposure. Often the
goal is to ward off changes in control. In doing so, corporations are
26 Lauren Cohen, Karl B. Diether & ChristopherJ. Malloy, Supply and Demand Shifts
in the Shorting Market, 62J. FIN. 2061, 2067-70 (2007).
27 We discuss the size of the share lending market infra in Part IV.C. 1.
28 Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and Efficiency (Nov. 14,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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doing indirectly what corporate law forbids doing directly-owning
and voting the company's shares in itself. Corporations can also use a
hedged position in another company to influence the outcome of a
takeover bid or other major transaction.
Most strategies for corporate empty voting are variants on the soft
parking theme we discussed above for hidden (morphable) owner-
ship. Company insiders arrange for voting ownership to be held by
someone else, and ensure that the someone else has incentives to vote
pro-management. Usually, the voteholder is not formally obliged to
vote as management directs-that would invite disallowance of the
votes under corporate law. Incentives and informal understandings
do the work instead. The corporation can soft park their shares with a
variety of people, in a variety of ways. A nonexhaustive list of exam-
ples includes equity swaps, forward transactions, share loans to trust-
worthy stock borrowers, ESOPs, and issuance of restricted shares. We
discuss these in turn.
One strategy involves the corporation acquiring economic owner-
ship of its shares through an equity swap or other equity derivative
contract with a derivatives dealer or other professional friend. In sub-
stance, the corporation has repurchased its own shares. But the shares
remain outstanding and votable. By whom?
The dealer, in all likelihood. The dealer will be short on the swap.
It can hedge its economic risk by holding matched shares, much as if
it entered into a similar swap with an outside investor. The structure
of this transaction is the same as the hidden ownership structure we
discussed above for outside shareholders-except that, unlike an out-
side shareholder, the corporation should be seen as having repur-
chased its shares, rather than being an economic owner. Formally, a
corporation's own shares, when owned by the corporation, are no
longer considered to be outstanding. 9 If the dealer will vote as di-
rected by the corporation, the corporation can be seen as an empty
voter, with hidden, morphable voting rights. The dealer becomes the
corporation's voting agent. The transaction could well be large; the
principal limit is the corporation's financial ability to repurchase its
own shares.
The dealer's incentives to vote as its client would want are similar
to the hidden ownership scenario. The dealer wants to stay on good
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (2001); Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Cor-
porate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Provi-
sions, 34 BUs. LAW. 1867, 1869, 1878 (1979).
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terms with this client and preserve a reputation for treating clients
well. The incentives that give outside investors morphable voting
rights are the same or perhaps stronger. The dealer will presumably
understand that the company is acquiring swaps rather than shares for
the purpose of leaving votes in friendly hands. The dealer would frus-
trate the transaction's purpose if it were to either hedge with anything
but matched shares, or fail to vote as its client wants. A further factor
is the dealer's need to sell the matched shares when the swap expires;
this can be especially important if the shares are thinly traded or the
swap is related to a sizeable block of shares. The company will be the
most likely and sometimes the only plausible purchaser of the shares.
By voting against management, the derivatives dealer could under-
mine its ability to unwind the transaction-and for what? The dealer
has no economic stake in the company and doesn't really care how
the vote comes out.
This soft parking strategy has advantages over two similar defen-
sive strategies sometimes used by companies to defend against outside
attacks: stock buybacks and sale of shares to a "white squire. '0  As
with a stock buyback, the company's share price may increase, making
the outside bid less attractive. But, unlike a stock buyback, the pur-
chased shares can be voted. Suppose, for example, that insiders con-
trol 25% of a company's shares. A buyback of another 20% will leave
them owning 25%-a stronger but not impregnable position. Soft
parking of another 20% will give them 40% of the votes, and thus
come much closer to full control.
An alternative is to place stock directly into friendly hands: a so-
called "white squire" who is expected, and sometimes contractually
required, to support management, at least for a period of time. How-
ever, here too, soft parking can have advantages. First, it is quick. It
takes time to identify, negotiate, and consummate a transaction with a
white squire, and the effort might fail altogether. Second, the white
squire transaction is more likely to require public disclosure.' Third,
the New York Stock Exchange generally requires shareholder approval
for a company to issue more than 20% of its shares in this context, so
30 For descriptions of these two non-decoupling-based strategies, see Dennis J.
Block, Public Company M&A: Recent Developments in Corporate Control, Protective Mecha-
nisms and Other Deal Protection Techniques, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2007:
CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANsAcTIONs 7, 145-46 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1584, 2007).
31 We discuss the disclosure rules that apply to soft parking infra in Part IlI.C.
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white squire transactions typically remain below this threshold. 32
There is no comparable shareholder approval rule for derivatives
transactions. Finally, white squires may not remain faithful.
There are potential risks to this strategy. First, shares in the hands
of the derivatives dealer could be deemed akin to shares in the hands
of a subsidiary or other entity controlled by the corporation, in which
case they could not be voted 3  But this issue has not been litigated
and the applicability of these analogies is far from clear. Second,
takeover defenses are subject to judicial scrutiny. The likely standard
of review would be that of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Uni-
trin, Inc. v. American General Corp. Under the Unocal test, as refined in
Unitrin, a defensive action cannot be coercive or preclusive, and must
otherwise fall within a range of reasonableness as a response to a per-
ceived threat. 35 A change of control transaction must meet the stricter
standard of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, but the in-
formal nature of soft parking, even if it conveys effective control,
might well let it escape Revlon scrutiny.
36
We are not yet aware of U.S. corporations employing this equity-
swap strategy, but it is used in Europe. We are aware of one major de-
rivatives dealer using PowerPoint outlines to market such strategies to
European corporations. In addition, an effort to park treasury shares
with a dealer (Barclays Bank) formed part of Portugal Telecom's suc-
cessful defense against a 2006 takeover bid by its smaller rival, Sonae-
32 NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2007).
33 On voting of shares held by a subsidiary or otherwise controlled by the corpora-
tion, see JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS
§§ 13.16, 21.7 (1997). The risk of the shares losing voting power might increase if the
corporation were to bind the dealer contractually to hedge through matched shares, to
ensure that the dealer retained voting rights.
34 Similar issues have been litigated in New Zealand and Australia, with regard to
whether morphable economic ownership was covered by large shareholder disclosure
rules. In both countries, appellate courts ruled that disclosure was not required. See
Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 836-37 (Perry-
Rubicon) and 840 (Glencore-Austral Coal).
35 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995); see also Meredith M. Brown &
William D. Regner, The Duties of Target Company Directors Under State Law: The Business
Judgment Rule and Other Standards ofJudicial Review, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL 2007: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS, su-
pra note 30, at 187, 193.
36 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986) (requiring close judicial scrutiny of transactions which result in a change of con-
trol, often referred to as "Revlon' scrutiny).
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com.3 7 As part of its defense, the board of Portugal Telecom also of-
fered to spin off its affiliate, PT Multimedia. A press report noted that
Portugal Telecom held 58% of PT Multimedia's shares directly and
"controls also another 10 pct, which are in the hands of British Bar-
clays, in the scope of two 'equity swap' contracts."
Other variations on the soft parking theme are also possible. A
simple forward transaction with a friendly shareholder can also do.
Consider the 1994 proxy fight between the Union Bank of Switzerland
(UBS) and activist Martin Ebner.39 UBS reportedly entered into for-
ward contracts with two large shareholders, under which UBS would
buy these shareholders' UBS shares soon after a critical stockholders'
meeting. The economics were equivalent to an immediate repurchase
of shares, plus a short-term loan from the sellers to UBS. However,
the voting rights remained with the sellers, at least one of which was
expected to vote as UBS wanted.0
Several additional soft parking strategies are based on the use of
"treasury shares"-shares that a company has repurchased, which it
cannot directly vote. The company can either (1) "sell" the shares to a
friendly dealer, while taking back an equity swap or otherwise protect-
ing the dealer against loss; or (2) simply lend the shares to a friendly
holder. Consider share lending. The borrower would be an empty
voter, serving as the agent of the corporation. There are no cases on
point, but as long as the borrower is not contractually bound to vote as
the lender's management wishes, its votes might well count. We as yet
37 Our discussion of Portugal Telecom is based on information provided by
knowledgeable Portuguese investment bankers and lawyers. See also Lisbon Shares Lower
Midmorning Led by Telecoms Ahead of Portugal Telecom EGM, AFX INT'L FOCUS, Mar. 2,
2007 (stating that "PT management also intends to use 1.8 pct of the company's shares
held by Barclays Bank to vote at the EGM [Extraordinary General Meeting] today").
38 Portugal Telecom Shareholders Turn Down Sonaecom Takeover Bid, PORT. Bus. DIG.,
Mar. 5, 2007. For general information about the Sonaecom bid for Portugal Telecom,
though not specifically about share parking, see, for example, Paul Betts, Low Ceilings,
FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 7, 2007, at 22; Peter Wise, Investors Block Sonaecom Bidfor PT
Telecoms, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2007, at 19.
39 Our discussion relies on Claudio Loderer & Pius Zgraggen, When Shareholders
Choose Not To Maximize Value: The Union Bank of Switzerland's 1994 Proxy Fight, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Fall 1999, at 91.
40 By way of comparison, U.S. companies sometimes enter into forward purchases
of their own shares to hedge obligations under employee benefit plans. Seejim Roth-
well, Common Derivatives and Their Uses-Equity Derivatives, in SWAPS AND OTHER DE-
RIVATIVES IN 2006, at 51, 73 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook No. B-1559,
2006). No one has suggested that the counterparty loses voting rights.
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know of no significant U.S. examples, but this form of soft parking has
been used a number of times in Europe.
In the summer of 2007, OMV, an Austrian oil and gas firm, raised
its stake in its Hungarian competitor, MOL, from 10% to 18.6%, and
soon thereafter launched a takeover bid.4' As a defensive measure,
MOL launched a massive stock buyback program. By late August,
MOL had bought back nearly half (48.8%) of its own previously out-
standing shares, with 7.8% held directly and another 41% lent to two
Hungarian banks. MOL spent more than $2 billion buying itself.
Decoupling played a critical part in MOL's defense. Under Hun-
garian law, a firm cannot vote its own shares.42 MOL avoided this limi-
tation by lending most of the repurchased shares to the two banks.
The banks were nominally free to vote as they wished but could not
sell the shares and were widely expected to vote them as MOL man-
agement wished. OMV said as much publicly in September 2007,
when it announced an offer to purchase MOL shares. OMV referred
to "MOL management's effective control of shares in MOL which
many in the financial markets believe now amounts to control over
approximately 40% of the shares established through the use of vari-
ous structural arrangements (a situation that has not been refuted by
MOL) .,,
In the Netherlands, corporate soft parking has been common, at
least until recently. One example involves the issuance of shares to a
company-controlled foundation, which then sells depositary receipts
41 Our discussion of MOL is based on Austrian Oil Company Chief Interviewed on
Likely Hungarian Merger, Russian Links, BBC MONITORING EUR., Aug. 17, 2007; Buda-
pest Stock Buyback News in Brief-MOL, OTP, HUNG. BUS. DIG., Aug. 27, 2007; The
Hungarian Defence, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2007, at 58; Hungarian MOL Willing 7o Buy
into OMV, HUNG. BUS. DIG., Aug. 22, 2007; Hungarian Stock Buyback News in Brief-
MOL, OTP, HUNG. BUS. DIG., Aug. 17, 2007; Karin Strohecker, OMV's Bid for MOL
Seen with Slim Chance of Success, REUTERS (U.K), Sept. 26, 2007, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL2688797420070926; Sandra Pointel &
Katalin Toth, OMV Will Not Launch Takeover Immediately, But Pressure on MOL 's Manage-
ment Could Increase, FT.COM, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/af36860e-
6c2c-11 dc-aOcf-0000779fd2ac,dwpuuid=e8477cc4-c820-1 db-b0dc-000b5df 10621 html.
42 Act IV of 2006 on Business Associations, §§ 227, 285 (Hung.), available at
http://www.irm.hu/?katid=265&id=294.
43 OMV Sends Declaration of Intent to Hungary's MOL, Would Offer HUF 32,000 per
Share, PORTFOLIO.I-IU, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.portfolio.hu/en/tool/
print.tdp?cCheck=l&k=l&i=13041. For a description of the offer, see, for example,
Guy Chazan, OMV's Bid Fails To Sway MOL, WALL ST.J., Sept. 26, 2007, at A8. MOL has
not denied controlling the bank-held shares. See Ed Crooks, OMVAsks Brussels'Approval
for€ 14bn Mol Bid, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 2007, at 20.
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to the public." The depositary receipts are nonvoting; the public
ends up with economic ownership while the foundation retains the
voting rights. Dutch firms have also granted to a company foundation
a call option, which the foundation can exercise to acquire shares and
thus voting rights if a threat to control arises. 5 In 2006, for example,
two hedge funds acquired 31% of Stork NV. In response, the Stork
Foundation exercised an option (granted in 1990) to acquire prefer-
ence shares with a high ratio of votes to economic rights; the prefer-
ence shares represented just less than 50% of Stork's total voting
rights. The Dutch courts disallowed the issuance.46
3. Employee Stock Ownership Plans; Restricted Stock Plans
A company can also arrange for friendly votes through ESOPs and
like plans, and by granting restricted shares to its executives. Employ-
ees who own shares can be expected to support management against a
hostile takeover, because they fear a threat to their jobs (rightly or
not). 4  One recent study estimates that "each additional percentage
point of employee ownership reduces the annual probability of take-
over by 0.44 percentage points."
48
How, though, does employee ownership relate to empty voting?
There are two principal possibilities. Consider ESOPs first. The term
covers a variety of arrangements, some subject to the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA), others not and hence offering
greater flexibility. 49 The company can simply allocate shares to em-
44 See Brian Quinton, Continental Shifts, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2004, at 54; cf
Jan van der Horst & Marleen van Uchelen-Schipper, The Netherlands (undated analy-
sis, provided Oct. 29, 2007 by Prof. Joseph McCahery to Henry Hu) (describing how
depositary receipts work under Dutch law).
45 Bill McIntosh, Court Nixes Stork Poison Pill, but Cancels EGM, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 962714. Some foundations are apparently
being dismantled. See Dry Questions for Dutch Investors, FIN. TIMES EUR., Mar. 21, 2006,
at 12, available at 2006 WLNR 4650147.
46 See Centaurus Alpha Master Fund Ltd. v. Stork N.V., College van Beroep voor
het Bedrijfsleven [CBB] [court of appeal from decisions of public trade organiza-
tions], Amsterdam, 17 januari 2007, No. 15/2007 OK, available at
http://zoeken.rechspraak.nl (search by docket number).
47 See, e.g., Block (2007), supra note 30, at 147 ("ESOP shares are likely to be voted
or tendered in a manner consistent with management's interests.").
48 Joshua D. Rauh, Own Company Stock in Defined Contribution Pension Plans: A Take-
over Defense?, 81J. FIN. ECON. 379, 381 (2006).
49 See Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of
ESOPs, Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies," 92 CORNELL L. REv. 865, 885 (2007); see
also Theodore N. Mirvis, Takeover Law and Practice 2006, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAW-
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ployees over time as the shares vest. If so, there would be no empty
voting. But a company can also contribute a block of stock to an
ESOP, with the shares to vest over an extended period. In this ar-
rangement, all shares carry voting rights, even though employees eco-
nomically own only the vested shares. There are then two common
choices for how these shares are voted. In the first approach, the trus-
tees for the ESOP decide how to vote these shares. Those trustees can
be anyone, including company managers. The trustee becomes an
empty voter, and will predictably vote pro-manager. This is similar to
soft parking except that the structure is long term and the shares will
eventually vest in employee hands.
In the second approach, the ESOP trust agreement provides that
unvested shares will be voted proportionately to the votes cast by em-
ployees with respect to vested shares, and perhaps that unvested shares
will be tended into a tender or exchange offer in the same proportion
as vested shares. 5° Here the employees are partially empty voters-
they have more voting power than economic ownership. The De-
partment of Labor has found proportional voting to be reasonable
under ERISA.5'
"Leveraged" ESOPs, which have more total shares than vested
shares, have long been used as a takeover defense, though perhaps
52less often once poison pills became the dominant defense. One no-
table example was NCR Corporation's (NCR) attempt to defeat a
takeover by AT&T in 1991. NCR's board responded to the AT&T bid
by adopting an ESOP which held 8% of NCR's total votes; each em-
ployee received 1 vested share and 228 unvested shares, which would
vest over the next 25 years.- 3 The effort failed; the Ohio court found
that the adoption of the ESOP was "not related to benefits objectives
but, rather, was an attempt to place as large a number of shares into
friendly hands as possible."54
YERS & LITIGATORS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAw DEVELOPMENTS 2007, at 147
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1599, 2007) (describing
various plans designed to encourage employee ownership of stock, including non-
ERISA Stock Employee Compensation Trusts).
50 See Block (2007), supra note 30, at 148; Mirvis (2007), supra note 49, at 258.
51 See Mirvis (2007), supra note 49, at 258-60; cf Brown & Regner (2007), supra
note 35, at 262-63 (noting that Delaware courts have similarly found proportional vot-
ing reasonable).
52 See, e.g., Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, ESOPs and Corporate Control, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 525, 527-30 (1990); Mirvis (2007), supra note 49, at 260.
53 NCR Corp. v. AT&T, 761 F. Supp. 475, 478-82 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
54 Id. at 482.
2008]
650 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW
Some additional examples follow. In the United States, as with
any takeover defense, the creation or expansion of an ESOP will be
judged under the Unocal standard, discussed above for soft parking. 55
Some were allowed by the courts; others were not.
* In 2002, Quanta Services adopted an ESOP in response to
Aquila's takeover attempt.
56
* In 1999, in response to LVMH's acquisition of 34% of the
outstanding shares of Gucci, Gucci established an ESOP
and issued an equal number of shares to it.57
* In 1989, Dunkin' Donuts created an ESOP to respond to a
possible hostile takeover bid by Kingsbridge Capital
581Group.
* In 1988, Polaroid adopted an ESOP involving 14% of its
shares in response to a takeover bid by Shamrock Hold-
ings.59
* In 1988, Macmillan attempted (unsuccessfully) to fend off
Maxwell Communications by, among other things, con-
tributing shares to an existing ESOP and replacing the
trustee with members of management. 60
A second possibility for empty voting arises from grants of re-
stricted shares, often principally to managers and key employees. 6'
The shares are "restricted" because they vest over time, typically sev-
eral years; unvested shares are usually forfeited if the employee
62 63leaves. Both vested and unvested shares usually carry voting rights.
55 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
56 Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Servs., Inc., 805 A.2d 196, 199-202 (Del. Ch. 2002). The
Chancery Court concluded that Quanta's decision to create the ESOP would likely not
satisfy the second prong of the Unocal test for defensive tactics, that of a proportionate
response to the threat posed by the Aquila bid. Id. at 207-08.
57 The Netherlands courts suspended the voting rights of both the ESOP and
LVMH. Jan Willem van der Staay, Public Takeovers in the Netherlands, CORP. FIN., Jan.
2000, at 83.
See Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., Nos. 10907, 10809,
10825, 10829, 10831, and 10889, 1989 WL 89449, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989).
59 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. Ch.
1989).
W Cynthia Crossen & Karen Blumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal that Failed, WALL
ST.J., Nov. 4, 1988, at B1.
61 See Brad J. Schwartzberg & Evan Weiner, Attracting and Retaining Key Employees by
Offering Equity-Based Incentive Compensation, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 2007,
at 44.
62 SeeJanice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compen-
sation To Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term
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Thus, the recipient has more voting rights than economic interest,
leading to partially empty voting. 4 As restricted stock plans grow in
popularity relative to stock options, these plans could become a sig-
nificant source of empty voting.
65
4. Empty Voting of Another Company's Shares
A further possibility involving corporate empty voting involves two
firms whose fortunes are linked in some way-acquirer and target are
the most obvious possibilities. First, any time an acquirer needs a
shareholder vote to complete an acquisition, the target and its share-
holders may try to influence the acquirer's vote by obtaining votes
without accompanying economic ownership. The Perry-Mylan inci-
dent, discussed in Decoupling I, involves such an effort by a target
66shareholder. But targets could use similar strategies themselves, ei-
ther directly or through friendly investment banks. No disclosure
rules directly address this possibility, so it might well remain hidden,
especially if done indirectly.
It is also possible for the acquirer or its shareholders to buy target
votes. In Decoupling I, we described the effort of Sears Holding to in-
fluence the votes on shares of its Sears Canada subsidiary, ostensibly
held by minority shareholders, in order to obtain the majority-of-
minority approval it needed under Canadian law to complete a
67freezeout. In Germany, Lindner Holding sought in 2006 to use bor-
rowed shares in a subsidiary to reach the 95% threshold under Ger-
Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971, 1026 (2004); Nazar Khodorovsky, Note, In-
consistent Obligations: Robinson v. United States or How an Agency Problem Whipsawed the
IRS, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 463 (2006).
63 See George G. Jones & Mark A. Luscombe, Changes to Tax Laws Boost Interest in
Restricted Stock, Acr. TODAY, Aug. 18, 2003, at 10, 11; Stuart R. Singer, Deferred Compen-
sationforExecutives Under Sec. 409A (pt. 1), TAX ADVISER, July 2006, at 402, 405.
rA The extent of empty voting by executives who receive restricted shares will de-
pend on, among other things, the recipient's expectation that he will likely stay
through the vesting period and the possibility that the recipient also holds employee
stock options (which convey economic ownership without voting rights) and hence
may not be an empty voter based on the recipient's full position.
65 On the growing popularity of restricted stock relative to stock options, see, for
example, Jones & Luscombe (2003), supra note 63, at 10; Harry Levitt & Bill Gardiner,
Phantom Stock Plans: A Viable Alternative to Restricted Stock?, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS
RE\.,July-Aug. 2004, at 19.
66 Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 816-17.
67 Id. at 839.
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man law needed to complete a freezeout. The German courts did not
allow the borrowed shares to count toward the threshold.
68
More generally, activist shareholders fairly often oppose buyouts
and freezeouts, seeking a higher price. Do some acquirers, when fac-
ing active opposition, directly or indirectly buy some target votes, us-
ing one or more of the strategies we have outlined? Do deal oppo-
nents sometimes buy votes? Rumors swirl, but no one knows for sure
how often this happens.
The recent high-profile takeover battle for ABN Amro offers a
twist on these scenarios. There were two bidders: Barclays (U.K) and
a consortium of Fortis (Belgium), Royal Bank of Scotland, and
Santander (Spain). 69  Fortis needed shareholder approval to issue
shares to finance its part of the consortium's bid. Some traders be-
lieved that ABN Amro borrowed Fortis shares so it could vote against
the financing. One trader reported receiving an "unlimited borrow"
request by ABN Amro for Fortis shares, and said that Fortis borrowing
levels "went through the roof."7 ° ABN Amro denied that it was bor-
rowing Fortis shares on its own behalf. The true facts are unclear, but
it seems likely that many investors borrowed Fords shares in order to
vote on the financing.
D. Shareholder Obligations: Avoiding Disclosure
1. Outside Shareholders
Thus far, we have focused primarily on how decoupling has af-
fected shareholder rights, most notably voting rights. Decoupling can
also affect shareholder obligations, such as the obligation to disclose
large ownership stakes. The United States and many other countries
require large shareholder disclosure, in various forms.7 These disclo-
68 We thank Professor Dr. Theo Baums for providing information on this case. See
Oberlandesgericht Mfinchen [OLG Mfinchen] [Munich Court of Appeals] Nov. 23,
2006, 2006 Zeitschrift ffir Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 2370 (F.R.G.) (German decisions do
not include party names).
69 Our discussion of ABN Amro is based primarily on Louise Armitstead, Dutch Op-
tions Riddle, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 22, 2007, § 3, at 2; Jane Croft, Fears that
Hedge Funds Are Out To Block Fortis, FIN. TIMES (London), July 27, 2007, at 22; Steve
Goldstein, ABN Amro Declares Neutrality on Buyout Offers, DOWJONES BUS. NEWS, July 30,
2007; Carrick Mollenkamp, Fortis Borrowing Surges: Backers, Opponents Work Toward Posi-
tion To Influence Vote, WALL ST.J. EUR.,July 27, 2007, at 18.
70 Armitstead (2007), supra note 69.
71 We discuss the U.S. rules in Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006),
supra note 1, at 867-75.
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sure rules often depend on possession of voting rights beyond speci-
fied thresholds. Thus, in the United States, a 5% (voting ownership)
shareholder must file a Schedule 13D or 13G, and all institutions must
report their shareholdings quarterly on Form 13F. Physically settled
derivatives count toward the 13D/13G threshold, but cash-settled de-
rivatives do not. In contrast, economic-only ownership usually does
not count toward triggering disclosure, and may not need to be dis-
closed even if a filing is otherwise required .
This leads to a simple avoidance strategy, which we discuss in De-
coupling I and summarize above: an investor can hold economic-only
ownership, through equity swaps or other derivatives. As we discussed
above, this ownership is often morphable-the investor has no official
voting rights, but can acquire them, to high probability, when needed.
2. Insiders
In contrast to outside shareholders, insiders--directors, officers,
and 10% shareholders of U.S. public companies-generally cannot
use decoupling to avoid disclosing their economic ownership stakes.
These persons are subject to disclosure requirements under Exchange
Act section 16. Section 16, in contrast to Schedule 13D, Schedule
13G, and Form 13F, focuses on economic ownership, and will thus
capture equity swaps and other equity derivatives, whether physically
settled or cash-settled.73
Decoupling can, however, be helpful in two ways. First, for 10%
shareholders, the reporting obligation includes economic ownership,
but the 10% ownership threshold is based on the same concept of
beneficial ownership used in Schedule 13D, which focuses on voting
power. Thus, a large shareholder can avoid becoming covered by sec-
tion 16 by holding equity swaps instead of shares. Second, the disclo-
sure is on an obscure filing-it may well be buried in the flurry of in-
sider ownership reports under Section 16. There can be dozens or
hundreds of such reports per firm per year. Many investors rely on
72 The relevant definition of beneficial ownership is in Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2007).
73 We discuss the section 16 disclosure requirements for cash-settled derivatives in
Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 873-74.
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the firm's annual proxy statement to indicate inside ownership-yet
proxy statement disclosure is again focused on voting rights.
4
3. The Corporation Itself
We have discussed above how firms can engage indirectly in empty
voting. One strategy involves the firm holding equity swaps on its own
shares. Here, one can see the corporation as economically having re-
purchased its own shares, while leaving the voting rights outstanding
and in friendly hands. What is hidden is the firm's repurchase of its
own shares. All else is similar to shareholder use of equity swaps to
create hidden (morphable) ownership. In the share lending variant
of corporate soft parking, in contrast, the company's ownership of its
own shares is disclosed, but not the existence of voting rights, which
are normally extinguished by a repurchase, but reappear when the
company lends the shares to an outsider.
For both variants, we discuss in Part III.C.1 the rules that govern
corporate disclosure. Depending on context and amount, these
strategies will often fall outside the usual corporate disclosure rules,
which focus on the company's transactions in its own shares.
II. REAL WORLD SIGNIFICANCE OF DECOUPLING
Is decoupling merely a curiosity? We often get this question in the
United States, but seldom in Europe. We believe that there is now
substantial evidence that decoupling is important and common, and
that it can materially affect the control of major corporations
throughout the world. Its public visibility-and perhaps its actual
use-has thus far been less in the United States than in Europe. Why
this is so is not clear. The techniques that work there largely will work
here as well. Our investors, insiders, investment bankers, and lawyers
are as clever as European ones-indeed, the investors, bankers, and
lawyers are often the same firms and sometimes the same people.
Perhaps U.S. market participants are better at keeping what they do
hidden. Perhaps they have thus far been more cautious. Many U.S.
firms have poison pill defenses, which limit the value of acquiring a
large economic-only position by impeding the later acquisition of vot-
ing rights. But U.S. examples exist-and more will surely emerge.
74 Exchange Act Schedule 14A, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2007) (requiring
ownership disclosure in proxy statements). Other periodic filings do not indicate in-
side ownership.
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In this Part, we provide two kinds of evidence of the worldwide
importance of decoupling. First, we offer a case study of Switzerland,
which illustrates decoupling's worldwide characteristics and its poten-
tial to influence takeover battles for major firms. What has happened
in Switzerland can happen elsewhere, including the United States.
Second, we provide a cumulative table of worldwide decoupling ex-
amples, which is greatly expanded compared to a similar table in De-
coupling I.
A. Swiss Stealth Takeovers, 2005-2007
Airport novels are fun: dark intrigues, financiers wealthy beyond
imagining, complex schemes, and the control of huge enterprises-if
not nations-hanging in the balance. For the Swiss, much of this oc-
curred for real in 2007.7' Sulzer, a major engineering firm, and other
flagship corporations discovered that deep-pocketed foreign investors
had secretly acquired massive stakes-32% in the case of Sulzer-with
a takeover bid soon to follow. With respect to Sulzer, these foreign-
ers-two Austrians and a Russian oligarch-had been helped by a ma-
jor Swiss bank, Zurcher Kantonalbank (ZKB). Similar dramas in
2005-2007 involved Saurer, first versus Laxey Partners, a hedge fund,
and later versus this Austro-Russian group (which acquired Laxey's
stake in Saurer); Ascom versus the Austrians alone (Victory Industrie-
beteiligung (Victory Industrial)); Converium versus Scor (its French
competitor); Implenia versus Laxey Partners; and Unaxis versus Vic-
tory Industrial. The real or imagined presence of Victory Industrial
may have caused jumps in the shares of many other mid-sized Swiss
76industrial companies.
Let us look at these examples, which all involve hidden
(morphable) ownership, starting with Sulzer. As background, at the
beginning of 2007, Swiss rules required disclosure of large ownership
stakes but focused on possession of voting rights. Public disclosure
was required if an investor's holdings of shares exceeded 5% of the
shares. The rules also captured physically settled call options, but not
cash-settled derivatives.
Sulzer/Victoy Industrial-Vekselberg (2007). The Swiss business com-
munity and regulators were shocked when an Austro-Russian group
75 See Henry T. C. Hu, Die Offenlegung anpassen, FINANZ UND WIRTscHAFT, Sept. 19,
2007, at 1.
76 Haig Simonian, Victoy jitters Strike Swiss Industrialists, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar.
19, 2007, at 24.
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announced it had secretly amassed a 32% stake in the engineering
firm. The group proceeded to bid for and acquire Sulzer. Meanwhile,
the news created an uproar resulting in the resignations of the CEO
and head of investment banking at ZKB and a police raid on Deutsche
Bank's Zurich offices.
Viktor Vekselberg, a Russian oligarch and billionaire investor, and
his company Renova joined forces with two prominent Austrian raid-
ers, Georg Stumpf and Ronny Pecik, and their company Victory Hold-
ings. Their investment vehicle, named Everest, used cash-settled call
options, provided primarily by ZKB and Deutsche Bank, to amass a
large stake in Sulzer. When it was ready to disclose its stake and make
a bid, it unwound the swaps and obtained these dealers' matched
shares. In early 2007, Sulzer's shares rose amid speculation that Vic-
tory was secretly acquiring shares. Finally, Everest announced in April
that it owned 18% of Sulzer's shares and held options to acquire an-
other 14%-32% overall. ZKB then came under fire for participating
in Everest's secret build-up in ZKB's own long-time client, Sulzer. The
chief executive of ZKB and various department heads resigned or
were fired. The bank's board stated that, while ZKB would continue
derivatives activity, it would not knowingly participate in hostile take-
overs of the bank's clients.
Ascom/Victory Industrial (2007) and Unaxis/Victory Industrial (2005).
Earlier in 2007, Victory announced it had acquired a 20% stake in As-
com, a Swiss electronics systems company. The stake was composed of
15% shares and 5% call options. Victory later raised its stake to 25%.
Here too, Ascom's share price rose before the announcement on specu-
lation that Victory might make a bid. Several months later, and after
Ascom's share price had nearly doubled, Victory sold its stake to ZKB. 8
Victory first used decoupling strategies to build a hidden stake in
2005 at Unaxis, a Swiss technology company. 79 Victory secretly ac-
77 Our discussion of Sulzer is based on Paul Betts, Locusts in Switzerland, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 25, 2007, at 26; Carl Mortished, Deutsche's Zurich Offices Raided in Op-
tions Inquiry, TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at 56; and Haig Simonian, ZKB Head Quits
in Row on Disclosure, FIN. TIMES (London), May 8, 2007, at 24.
78 Our discussion of Ascom and Unaxis is based on Ascom Plunges As Victory Divest-
ment Ends Takeover Speculations, AFX INT'L Focus, May 24, 2007; Chris Flood, Dexia
"Hidden Jewel" Highlighted FIN. TIMES (London),Jan. 19, 2007, at 36; OC Oerlikon Owner
Victory Holds 20.1 Pct Stake in Swiss Telecoms Co Ascom, AFX INT'L FOcUS, Jan. 17, 2007;
and Haig Simonian, Raiders Unnerve Swiss Regulator, FIN. TIMES EUR., Mar. 21, 2007, at 17.
79 Our discussion of Unaxis is based on Carl Mortished, Bodycote Board ReJects Fourth
Takeover Approach from Sulzer, TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2007, at 58; Simonian (2007),
supra note 76; Simonian (2007), supra note 78; Press Release, OC Oerlikon, Disclosure
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quired a 30% stake in Unaxis using call options. Victory then re-
placed the entire Unaxis board, except the CEO, and changed the
company's name to OC Oerlikon. In July 2007, under new Swiss dis-
closure regulations, Victory announced it held 68% of Oerlikon-30%
through shares, 21% in physical-delivery call options, and 17% in vari-
ous cash-settled derivatives. The SWX Swiss Exchange is reportedly
investigating Oerlikon for possible breaches of disclosure and publica-
tion rules.
Saurer/(Laxey Partners and Later Victory Industrial) (2006-2007).
Hidden (morphable) ownership tactics were used twice with Saurer,
the Swiss machinery maker. First, hedge fund Laxey Partners an-
nounced a previously undisclosed 13% stake, through a combination
of shares and options.8 0 Laxey demanded various governance changes
and built its stake to 24%. Unaxis separately used cash-settled options
to acquire a further 21%, bought Laxey's stake, and emerged as a 45%
holder, without prior disclosure. Unaxis (now Oerlikon) then an-
nounced a tender offer for the remaining Saurer shares. The Saurer
board accepted a revised offer.
Implenia/Laxey Partners (2007). Laxey Partners again built a large
stake in a Swiss company. Laxey announced in April 2007 that it held
23% of Implenia, a construction group. The stake was likely acquired
initially through cash-settled options.81 Implenia asked regulators to
investigate how Laxey had built its stake without disclosure. Implenia
also refused Laxey's attempts to register Laxey's holding of more than
4.9% of its shares, citing the Swiss Lex Koller law, which prevents for-
eigners from buying Swiss real estate. Laxey then sued Implenia and
of Victory Interests in Accordance with Stock Market Rules (Apr. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.oerlikon.com/ecomaXL/index.php?site=OERLIKON EN-ad-hoc-release
s.detail&udtxid=135; and OC Oerlikon, Disclosure of Shareholding Pursuant to Stock
Exchange Act (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.oerlikon.com/ecomaXL/
index.php?site=OERLIKON EN-mandatory_notifications detail&udtxid=4432.
80 Our discussion of Saurer is based on OC Oerlikon, ANNUAL REPORT 2006: LIV-
ING HIGH TECHNOLOGY 5 (2006), available at http://www.oerlikon.com/
annualreport2006/downloads/OerlikonAnnual-Report_2006_e.pdf; Andrew Bulke-
ley, U.K. 's Laxey Ends Saurer Feud, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 7, 2006; Martin Gelnar, Saurer IH
Net Pfl -40%: Plans To Stay Solo, DOwJONES INT'L NEWS, July 26, 2005; Carl Mortished,
Swiss Investigate Vekselberg Firm Over Stake-Building in Engineer, TIMES (London), April 27,
2007, at 67.
S Our discussion of Implenia is based on Implenia Says Views Laxey's Stake as Hostile,
REUTERS (U.K.), Apr. 18, 2007; Implenia Shares Fall, Laxey Exerts Pressure, REUTERS, July
23, 2007; Strabag To Announce Next Week Purchase of Stake in Implenia, AFX INT'L Focus,
June 20, 2007; and Swiss Implenia Seen as Takeover Target for Hochtief Strabag Bouygues,
AFX INT'L FOCUS, June 13, 2007.
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forced Implenia into mediation. It remains to be seen whether Laxey,
or someone else, will acquire Implenia.
Converium/Scor (2007). Scor SA, a French reinsurer, announced in
February 2007 that it had acquired 33% of Swiss rival Converium
Holding AG, and planned to acquire the Swiss company. 8 Scor said it
had purchased 8% through direct market purchases and the balance
through share purchase agreements. Patinex, the investment vehicle
for Swiss financier Martin Ebner, acknowledged it had accumulated
and then sold to Scor close to 20% of Converium, in stock and op-
tions. The Swiss Federal Banking Commission later ruled that Ebner
and Scor had acted together in acquiring Converium shares, but this
ruling had little effect, since Converium later agreed to Scor's takeover.
B. The Swiss Regulatory Response
Prior to 2007, Swiss disclosure rules were similar to current U.S.
rules and required disclosure if an investor held more than 5% voting
ownership in a Swiss public company. Physically settled call options
counted toward the threshold, but cash-settled options and other de-
rivatives did not. As we have seen, this led to widespread use of hid-
den ownership, which then morphed into access to shares and voting
rights when needed.
83
82 Our discussion of Converium is based on Andrew Bulkeley, Converium Sues
French Suitor, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 18, 2007; Swiss Banking Commission Says Ebner, Scor Acted
as Team in Converium Takeover, AFX INT'L FOcus, July 22, 2007; Swiss Reinsurer Rejects
Takeover Bid by French, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 20, 2007, at 16; and Press Release,
Swiss Fed. Banking Comm'n, Takeover Chamber of the SFBC Confirms TOB-
Recommendation IV Dated 9June 2007 Regarding Converium (July 18, 2007).
83 See Loi f~drale sur les bourses et le commerce des valeurs mobili~res [LBVM]
[Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading (SESTA)] Mar. 24, 1995, SR
954.1, art. 20 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9/954.1.fr.pdf; Ordi-
nance de la Commission F~d~rale des banques sur les bourse et le commerce des
valeurs mobilires [OBVM-CFB] [Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission
on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading] June 25, 1997, SR 954.193, art. 13(3)
(Switz.) (repealed 2007), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9/954/93.fr.pdf.
Our discussion of these rules and the 2007 amendments is based on discussions with
Swiss regulators and knowledgeable Swiss market participants, as well as Alexander Vo-
gel & Christoph Heiz, Proposed Amendments of Swiss Disclosure Rules To Close Raider Loop-
holes, in EUROMONEY DERIVATIVES & RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 2007/08 (2007);
Georg G. Gotschev, The Duty To Disclose Significant Holdings in Listed Companies-The Fed-
eral Banking Commission Tightens the Regime, NEWSLETTER (Walder Wyss & Partners, Zu-
rich, Switz.), July 2007; Swiss Banking Commission To Tighten Disclosure of Shareholding
Rules from July, AFX INT'L FOCUS, May 13, 2007 (mentioning Daniel Zuberbuehler's
discussion of the need for this change in order to curb secretive takeovers); Letter
from the Swiss Fed. Banking Comm'n to Interested Persons (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
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In response to the events discussed above, the Swiss Federal Bank-
ing Commission amended its rules, effective July 1, 2007, to also re-
quire disclosure of cash-settled call options. Meanwhile, the Swiss Par-
liament rapidly adopted legislation, effective December 1, 2007, to
reduce the disclosure threshold to 3% and to require disclosure of
holdings of any financial product that would enable the holder to ac-
quire voting rights with respect to a potential public takeover. In No-
vember 2007, the Commission, among other things, indicated that it
would require additional disclosure of securities lending. This new
regulatory regime should quell stealth takeovers, but leaves empty vot-
ing not directly addressed.
C. The Worldwide Scope of Decoupling
The Swiss examples of stealth takeover bids are dramatic. But
what about the rest of the world? How much decoupling activity is
there? Without effective disclosure, we don't know. We can, however,
collect examples-the visible tip of the potential iceberg. Table 1
provides such a list. It expands on a similar table in Decoupling L We
then had 21 examples; we're now over 80.
This number seemingly grows almost anytime one of us travels
somewhere, gives a talk, and asks the audience for examples we are not
aware of. Moreover, as we discuss in Part III.B, the U.K. Takeover Panel
has determined that after it changed its disclosure rules to cover cash-
settled derivatives, the number of pertinent ownership disclosures in-
creased by about 19% over the period November 7, 2005, to May 31,
2007. Our own preliminary search for these disclosures for May 2007
produced 13 instances of disclosed decoupling for that single month.
The supply and demand factors that promote decoupling remain
in place. The emergence of huge sovereign wealth funds, and their
increasing proclivity to take large stakes in Western public corpora-
tions, may add to this trend. Today, sovereign wealth funds hold $1.5-
http://www.ebk.admin.ch/e/aktuell/index.html (appending a table displaying pro-
posed rule changes and commentary as of April 16, 2007); and Press Release, Swiss
Fed. Banking Comm'n, SFBC To Strengthen Shareholding Disclosure Rules (June 1,
2007), available at http://www.ebk.admin.ch/e/aktuell/index.html.
84 Swiss Fed. Banking Comm'n, New Provisions Regarding the Disclosure of Share-
holders (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.ebk.ch/e/aktuell/index.html; E-mail from G6rard
Hertig to Henry Hu (Nov. 10, 2007) (on file with author) (describing the central fea-
tures of these changes).
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2.5 trillion in assets-comparable to hedge funds.85 This level is grow-
ing rapidly, fueled by high oil prices. Borse Dubai used decoupling as
part of its 2007 takeover bid for OMX Group, the Swedish stock ex-
change operator, apparently in violation of both Swedish and British
rules. 86
85 On the assets held by sovereign wealth funds, see Joanna Chung & Tony Tassell,
The $2,500bn Question: How Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Muscling in on Global Markets, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at 11. On their activities, see, for example, Norma
Cohen, Rivals Grab Half of London Bourse, FIN. TIMES USA, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Carlyle To Sell Stake to a Mideast Government-20% of Buyout Firm To Be
Owned by Capital of United Arab Emirates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at Cl; John Will-
man, Big Spenders: How Sovereign Funds Are Stirring Up Protectionism, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don),July 30, 2007, at 7.
86 After findings by the Swedish Securities Council as to a breach of best practices
and an earlier finding by the U.K Financial Services Authority of a breach of securities
rules, Borse Dubai's CEO conceded that it "ought to have included further information
on the option contracts." Niklas Magnusson, Borse Dubai's OMX Bid Draws a New Repri-
mand, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 11, 2007, at 14; see a/soJonas Bergman, Swedish Regulator
Ends OMX Inquiry, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 4, 2007, at 16; David Ibison, Borse Dubai Suf-
fers Double Blow in Its Efforts To Take Over OMX FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 24, 2007, at 15;
Stanley Reed, The Battle for Sweden's OM. BUSINESSWEEKcOM, Aug. 23, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2007/gb20070823_153192.htm.
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87 Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Finance Version) (2007), supra note 1.
88 Insider hedging was part of the reason for Hong Kong's 2003 disclosure reforms,
as discussed in Decoupling L Similar hedging is rumored to take place elsewhere. The
value of diversification is substantial enough so that, with hedging opportunities now
widely available, it would be surprising if partial insider hedging were not widespread.
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89 See Enel Moves To Raise Stake in Endesa to 22 Percent with New Share-Swap Deal, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 2, 2007; Italy Enel Exercises Equity Swap on Spain Endesa Stake,
ANSA ENGLISH CORP. NEWS SERV., June 4, 2007.
90 See Peter Thal Larsen, RBS-Led Group Has Doubled ABN Stake, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Sept. 26, 2007, at 23.
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91 Jonathan Birchall, Ackman Takes 9.6% Stake in Target To Push for Changes, FIN.
TIMES (London),July 17, 2007, at 21;Jared A. Favole & Mike Barris, With 9.6% Stake in
Target, Ackman Fires Value Salvo, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at C3; Lisa Gewirtz-Ward &
John E. Morris, Pershing Buys 9.6% Stake in Target, DAILY DEAL, July 17, 2007; Hedge
Fund Raises Stake in Target, REUTERS, Dec. 25, 2007.
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92 Kara Scannell, "Broker Votes": Opponents May Win One, WALL ST.J.,June 13, 2007,
at Cl.
93 Whitehouse, Enrich & Stein (2007), supra note 13.
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94 Information on the Chandlers' plans to hedge is from a source familiar with the
transaction. See also Michael Oneal & John McCormick, Tribune Co. Welcomes Zell to
Board; Chandlers Exit, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 2007, § 3, at 1.
95 SeeJames Quinn, No Resting on Their Laurels at the LSE, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb.
15, 2007, at 5. Information that the 23% position was held through derivatives was pro-
vided by a knowledgeable U.K. market participant.
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96 Sarah Spikes, Funds' Battle with Stork Heats Up, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 24,
2006, at 24; Press Release, Stork NV, Stork Requests Hearing of Witnesses Centaurus
and Paulson (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.stork.nl/page.html?ch=DEF&
id=4875&pr=200610/1079294.
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97 Public Company News, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 11, 2007, at 4D; White-
house, Enrich & Stein (2007), supra note 13.
98 Andrea Rothman & Heather Smith, Lagardere Shares Fall on EADS Insider Trading
Report, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 3, 2007.
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99 Information provided by a knowledgeable market observer.
100 See Adam Cohen, Wielding "Stichting" To Fight Takeovers: Dutch Tactic Allows Com-
panies To Shelter Assets from Predators, WALL ST.J. EUR., May 22, 2006, at 4.
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101 Istithmar PJSC, General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership
(Schedule 13D) (Feb. 16, 2006) (relating to Time Warner, Inc.).
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102 Information on this transaction is from a private source.
103 Personal knowledge of Bernard Black, arising from participation as expert wit-
ness in arbitration between IPOC International Growth Fund Limited (Bermuda) and
OAO "CT-Mobile" case before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
(2005-2006).
104 Barnet D. Wolf, Big Investor Wants Changes at Wendy's, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Apr. 27, 2005, at IA; Whitehouse, Enrich & Stein (2007), supra note 13.
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105 Trian Fund Mgmt, L.P., General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Owner-
ship (Schedule 13D) (Dec. 13, 2005) (relating to Wendy's International, Inc.).
06 Heather Smith, Bank Raid, Focus EUR., Summer 2006, at 32 (supp. to AM.
LAW.).
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107 This and a number of other Australian examples are summarized in TAKEOVERS
PANEL (Austl.), EQUITY DERIVATIVES: DRAFr GUIDANCE NOTE 2 (Sept. 10, 2007) and
TAKEOVERS PANEL (Austl.), DISCUSSION PAPER: EQUITY DERIVATIVES (Sept 10, 2007).
108 Exar Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement, Contested Solicitations (Schedule 14A)
(Oct. 3, 2005).
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1W9 Dennis Fitzgerald & Heidi Moore, Movers & Shakers: Week of April 12 2004,
DAILY DEAL, Apr. 12, 2004.
110 Information provided by Professor Woochan Kim of KDI School of Manage-
ment and Public Policy. Professor Kim is affiliated with PSPD (Peoples' Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy), a Korean shareholder rights group, which reported the in-
cident in a Korean language report in 2003.
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Il ASHURST, INVESTMENT BANKING BRIEFING: USE OF CFDS IN PUBLIC M&A (May
2004), available at http://www.ashurst.com/doc/aspx?id_Content=926.
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112 Tom Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant, Financial Tunnelling and the Revenge of the In-
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113 TAKEOVERS PANEL (Austl.), DISCUSSION PAPER: EQUITY DERIVATh'ES (2007),
supra note 107, 44.
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III. UPDATING OUR OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE PROPOSAL
The developments described in Part II suggest that there is urgency
to regulatory reform, in the United States and elsewhere. In Decoupling
I, we argued that, in regulating equity decoupling, disclosure offers the
best place to start.114 Section A summarizes the integrated ownership
disclosure proposal we developed there, and reviews disclosure reforms
in other countries. Section B evaluates the U.K's apparent success in
implementing shareholder disclosure rules similar to those we propose.
Section C extends our proposal to cover corporations. Section D pro-
poses enhanced disclosure of share lending and borrowing.
A. Our Integrated Ownership Disclosure Proposal
1. Current Rules and Our Disclosure Proposal
The United States currently has five sets of ownership disclosure
rules. With regard to equity decoupling, these rules treat economi-
cally similar positions differently both within and across disclosure re-
gimes, allow much new vote buying to remain undisclosed, allow
much economic-only ownership to remain hidden, provide little or no
disclosure of share lending and borrowing, and do not directly ad-
dress corporate decoupling. The current ownership disclosure re-
gimes for shareholders are:
* active 5% shareholders report their voting ownership and
material changes in ownership on Schedule 13D;
* passive investors report their voting ownership annually on
Schedule 13G, plus a filing if they cross 10%;
" institutional investors holding over $100 million in U.S.
equity securities report their share ownership (plus ex-
change traded call options) quarterly on Form 13F;
* insiders (directors, officers, and 10% shareholders) report
their economic ownership under section 16 of the Ex-
change Act; and
* mutual funds report their economic ownership quarterly,
through Forms N-1A, N-CSR, and N-Q.
The proxy rules and the tender offer rules may require additional dis-
closures by someone who launches a proxy contest or a tender offer.
114 See Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 864-86.
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To complicate matters further, the ownership positions that trig-
ger the disclosure requirements and the positions that must be dis-
closed once disclosure is required are often different. For example, a
13D filer must disclose contracts related to the company's shares, pre-
sumably including equity swaps. But equity swap holdings do not
count toward the disclosure threshold. Similarly, a 10% shareholder
must disclose economic ownership under section 16, but economic-
only ownership does not count toward the 10% threshold. OTC de-
rivatives are often not subject to disclosure when an equivalent posi-
tion using exchange-traded derivatives would be captured. Holding a
call option is sometimes treated differently from the nearly equivalent
writing of a put option.
These differences may once have made sense and some of the
gaps may once have been unimportant. But in a world of easy, large-
scale decoupling of economic from voting ownership and often easy
recoupling when needed, a massive OTC derivatives market, and a
pool of sophisticated hedge funds with the skill and incentives to use
decoupling to hide ownership or cast empty votes, broader, more con-
sistent coverage is needed.
We thus offered an "integrated ownership disclosure" proposal
that would provide improved public disclosure of both empty voting
and hidden ownership, while also streamlining the current ownership
disclosure rules. Our proposal contemplated:
(1) consistency as to which positions count toward disclosure
thresholds, and which positions must be disclosed if the
threshold is crossed;
(2) disclosure of both voting and economic ownership, arising
from shares or coupled assets;
(3) symmetric disclosure of positive and negative economic
ownership;
(4) reporting of share lending and borrowing positions; and
(5) reporting of significant instances of empty voting, above a
threshold percentage of the company's shares, such as
0.5%.
The proposal would ensure that economic-only ownership, whether
morphable or not, is not hidden. We would require real-time disclo-
sure of most empty voting by 13D and 16(b) filers, who must report
ownership changes promptly, but only delayed reporting by other filers.
We discuss the policy factors bearing on the optimal level of
shareholder disclosure in Decoupling I, and do not repeat that analysis
here. These requirements are rooted in the belief that investors, as
2008]
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well as society at large, should know who a company's major share-
holders are. Investors should also know whether those shareholders
are buying and selling and should have an opportunity to respond.
From an economic standpoint, share pricing will be more efficient if
investors know what major investors are doing and have advance no-
tice of possible changes in control. The integrity of, and confidence
in, the stock market will be enhanced. We also identified reasons
more directly related to equity decoupling. Disclosure can provide in-
formation on the frequency of empty voting and hidden (morphable)
ownership. Disclosure may also deter some new vote buying: not eve-
ryone will do in the sunshine what they will do in the dark. Moreover,
some empty voting strategies may be less effective if disclosed.
2. Regulatory Action to Date
Our integrated ownership disclosure proposal is consistent with
regulatory changes made by the U.K. Takeover Panel in November
2005 to govern ownership disclosure during takeover bids, in Hong
Kong in 2003 in response to aspects of the new vote buying, and in
Switzerland this year in response to the events recounted above.' 
5
Other regulators have also responded or are considering how to
respond to equity decoupling. In the U.K., the Financial Services Au-
thority has issued a consultation paper on disclosure reforms, which
would apply generally, not just during takeover bids." In Hong
Kong, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) reviewed the ef-
fectiveness of its 2003 reforms, released a consultation paper in 2005,
and put together a working group of market participants and investors
to investigate possible changes." 7 The Italian securities regulator,
Consob, is expected to review soon how its disclosure rules should re-
spond to hidden ownership. In September 2007, the Australian Take-
overs Panel issued a draft guidance note and a discussion paper, seek-
ing public comment on an approach that contemplates treating equity
derivatives, whether physically settled or cash-settled, the same as hold-
115 See id. at 879-80.
16 FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (U.K), DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCES: CON-
SULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK TEXT (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/cp/cp07_20.pdf.
117 See SEC. & FUTURES COMM'N (H.K), CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF
THE DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS REGIME UNDER PART XV OF THE SECURITIES AND Fu-
TURES ORDINANCE 1 (2005), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/notes/consult/EN/
apps/som /direviewco nsul t.nsf/ con tent/ Download/ 1/ $FILE/ Part% 20XY%20Consul ta
tion %20Paper%20200105%20-%2OEnglish.pdf.
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ings of shares for both disclosure and mandatory bid nles." s In the
Netherlands, a May 2007 report by the Corporate Governance Code
Monitoring Committee expresses concern with both disclosure of sig-
nificant holdings and empty voting; the Finance Ministry has placed
the Committee's report at the top of its work program for 2008. " 9
In the United States, both the SEC
20 and the Delaware judiciary
12'
have shown concern over decoupling. Institutional investors have
noted the importance of the issue. 1 Senior SEC officials, including
11 See TAKEOVERS PANEL (Austl.), EQUITY DERIVATIVES: DRAFT GUIDANCE NOTE
(2007), supra note 107; TAKEOVERS PANEL (Aust.), DISCUSSION PAPER: EQUITY DE-
RIVATIVES (2007), supra note 107. The enthusiasm for disclosure reform is not univer-
sal. For instance, Singapore's Securities Industry Council has been more hesitant. See
SEC. INDUS. COUNCIL, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS ON REVISION OF THE SINGAPORE
CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (2007); SEC. INDUS. COUNCIL, CONSULTATION PA-
PER ON REVISION OF THE SINGAPORE CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (2006). In
Hong Kong, the initial uproar over the 2006 Henderson Land short sale/empty voting
incident, discussed in Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note
1, at 834-35, has not prompted further regulation, beyond the 2002 disclosure reforms.
"9 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING COMM. (Neth.), ADVISORY RE-
PORT ON THE COMPANY-SHAREHOLDER RELATIONSHIP AND ON THE SCOPE OF THE CODE
(2007), available at http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/page/downloads/
Monitoring-CommitteeAdvisory-ReportMay_2007.pdf; Ministerie van Financien,
Werkprogramma Corporate Governance 2008/2009 (Corporate Governance Work
Program 2008/2009) (Neth.), http://www.minfin.nl/nl/actueel/kamerstukkenen_
besluiten,2007/10/FM07-2587.html (last visitedJan. 20, 2008).
120 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Scannell, Borrowed Shares] (reporting Chairman Cox's
statement that empty voting "is already a serious issue" and "is almost certainly going to
force further regulatory response"); cf Paul S. Atkins, SEC Commissioner, Remarks
Before 9th Annual Alternative Investment Roundup (Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO2907psa.htm (offering an extended
analysis of empty voting and vote morphing); Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Roundtable on
Proxy Voting Mechanics (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm (discussing share ownership and voting
issues); Ron Orol, SEC Holds Hearing on Proxy Rules, DAILY DEAL, May 28, 2007 (discuss-
ing SEC hearing relating to empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership); Kara
Scannell, Hedge Funds Vote (Often): In Proxies, Borrowed Shares Fill Ballot Box, WALL ST.J.,
Mar. 22, 2007, at C1 (stating that Chairman Cox asked senior staffers to provide rec-
ommendations by year's end).
121 For example, Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs has stated that,
"[s] hould an egregious case of empty voting abuse arise, that in turn may lead to legis-
lation and to court decisions that would result in a new paradigm for share voting."
Jack B. Jacobs, Paradigm Shifts in American Corporate Governance Law: A Quarter Century of
Experience, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 1, 4.
122 See, e.g., Ben White, Concern in US over "Empty Voting, "FIN. TIMES (London), Oct.
6, 2006, at 29 (quoting John Wilcox of TIAA-CREF as saying that decoupling "under-
mine[s] the most fundamental assumption in corporate governance"); Ben White, The-
sis on Hedge Fund Tactics Gives Investors a Shock-Professor's Warning on "Empty Voting" Has
Had Big Impact in the US, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 6, 2006, at 29 (noting the impact of
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Chairman Christopher Cox and Commissioner Paul Atkins, have spo-
ken publicly about empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership.
There have been published rumors as to forthcoming SEC disclosure
reforms, but as yet no proposed rules. 123
B. U.K. Experience with Disclosure Reform
Recent U.K experience provides reason to believe that disclosure
reform, along the lines we propose, is workable and not unduly costly.
We review that evidence in this section.
Since November 2005, the U.K Takeover Panel has required dis-
closure of both long and short economic ownership of 1% or more in
a target company during the pendency of a takeover bid, though not
at other times. This includes ownership through cash-settled "con-
tracts for differences" or "CFDs" (the British version of equity
swaps) .124 The 1% threshold aside, these reforms are similar to our
proposal. In 2007, the Takeover Panel Executive invited comments on
the new regime from trade bodies, hedge funds, companies which had
received takeover offers, money managers, and other capital market
participants. It received 89 responses out of 113 contacted entities.
The Panel Executive also sought to determine how the disclosure re-
forms affected the number of filings. 125 It estimated that filings in-
creased by approximately 19% over the period from November 2005
through May 2007. The overwhelming majority of the additional dis-
closures involved CFDs. The Executive found that these disclosures
were generally not complex or difficult to understand.
There was strong support for the enhanced disclosures across all
constituencies. Ninety percent of the respondents favored the new
disclosure regime, and most of those agreed that the rules had signifi-
cantly improved market transparency during offer periods. The Panel
Executive felt that the responses indicated that market participants
decoupling analysis on institutional investors); cf Barry Burr, Editorial, "Morphing"
Hedge Fund Ownership, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 16, 2006, at 10 (endorsing our
disclosure approach).
123 See Ron Orol, SEC Eyes Investors in Takeover Fights, DAILY DEAL, May 14, 2007
(reporting rumors as to possible new SEC disclosure rules to address decoupling).
124 The Takeover Code, Rule 8.3 (2006) (U.K); see also TAKEOVER PANEL (U.K),
DEALINGS IN DERIVATIVES AND OPTIONS (May 13, 2005), available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/consultation/DATA//PCP200502.pdf
(consultation paper).
125 TAKEOVER PANEL CODE COMM. (U.K), DERIVATIVES AND OPTIONS REGIME:
2007 REVIEW (June 29, 2007).
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had little difficulty in analyzing the disclosures. The Panel Executive's
report concluded that the disclosure rules were achieving the Panel's
principal objectives without imposing undue burdens on market par-
ticipants and, accordingly, that the rules were a proportionate regula-
tory response to the use of derivatives during takeover bids.
In November 2007, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), Brit-
ain's umbrella financial industry regulator, proposed disclosure rules
for CFDs. Unlike the Takeover Panel rules, this proposal is not lim-
ited to the period during a takeover bid. The FSA advanced two al-
ternative approaches for public comment. The first would deem a
holder of CFDs to have access to voting rights unless the holder meets
safe harbor requirements, including an explicit agreement with the
CFD writer that precludes the holder from exercising or seeking to
exercise voting rights, plus the holder's statement that it does not in-
tend to use CFDs to seek access to voting rights. If the safe harbor
were not met, CFDs would be disclosable if the holder's combined
CFD and share position exceeded 3%."6 If the safe harbor was met,
the issuer could still require disclosure of economic interests above
5%. 127 The second alternative would require disclosure of all CFDs
and other equity derivative-based economic interests above a 5%
threshold, which would be separate from the 3% disclosure threshold
for shares, with no aggregation across the two types of holdings. 1
28
Some hedge funds themselves have advocated increased transpar-
ency. In an effort to guide or perhaps deflect regulation by the U.K.
and other European countries, a group of 14 leading London-based
hedge funds convened a working group (Hedge Fund Working
Group) to prepare a hedge fund code of conduct, covering disclosure
and other matters. The Working Group's report, issued in October
2007, supports disclosure reform. 129 The report recommends that
European regulators adopt rules requiring all market participants to
disclose economic-only interests, including those held through equity
swaps. The Working Group agreed that companies "have a right to
126 FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (U.K) (2007), supranote 116, 1.28,5.33.
127 Id. 1.30, 5.35.
128 Id. 1.32, 5.51-5.53, 5.57.
129 HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP, HEDGE FUND STANDARDS CONSULTATION PAPER
PART 2: THE BEST PRACrICE STANDARDS 60 (Oct. 2007). For background on this draft
code of conduct, see Bertrand Benoit & James Mackintosh, German Support for Draft
Hedge Fund Code Eases Industry Pressure, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 13, 2007, at 15;James
Mackintosh, London Hedge Funds Planning First Voluntary Code of Conduct, FIN. TIMES
USA, Oct. 11, 2007, at 1.
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know who owns them" as well as those "who [have] an ability to easily
obtain significant voting power"-that is, those with morphable own-
ership.130 The Working Group recommended legal action because it
believed that voluntary disclosure by some hedge funds would cause
distortions because only some market participants would provide this
disclosure. The Working Group members stated their willingness to
work with regulators on the details of a mandatory regime, applicable
to all parties, that "ties votes to underlying economic exposure."
131
C. Extending Our Disclosure Reform Proposal to Corporate Decoupling
In Decoupling I, we focused on decoupling by hedge funds and
other outside investors. We were less concerned with insider disclo-
sure, because current section 16(b) disclosure already captures eco-
nomic ownership, and we did not discuss soft parking or other corpo-
rate decoupling. We now need to do so.
1. Current Disclosure Rules for Corporate Decoupling
We review in this section the rules that apply to soft parking and
other corporate decoupling; we propose additional disclosures in the
next section. Assume that a corporation engages in soft parking of
shares, in one of the ways outlined above. To make the analysis con-
crete, assume that the company takes the long side of equity swaps
with a derivatives dealer, expecting the dealer to hedge with matched
shares and vote with management. What disclosure rules apply?
No specific "line item" rules clearly apply. In some circumstances,
general disclosure principles based on "materiality" may apply. How-
ever, the SEC's past actions on disclosure of stock repurchases suggest,
at best, ambiguity as to the need for disclosure in many circumstances.
Stock exchange rules also provide no clear disclosure requirements.
The most directly relevant disclosure rule relates to corporate re-
purchases of shares. Until 2003, the SEC did not have a specific rule
on disclosure of share repurchases.132 In late 2002, the SEC proposed
adding Item 703 to Regulation S-K. In its proposing release, the SEC
130 HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP (2007), supra note 129, at 47.
131 Id. at 61.
132 See MatthewJ. Gardella, New SEC Rules for Stock Repurchases, INSIGHTS, Jan. 2004,
at 19.
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specifically asked for comments on whether corresponding disclosure
should be required for derivatives transactions.
33
The SEC apparently decided not to require disclosure of deriva-
tives transactions. Neither Item 703 nor the adopting release refers to
derivatives transactions.1 4 Under Item 703 and associated changes to
Forms 10-Q and 10-K, companies must provide information on pur-
chases of "shares or other units of any class of the issuer's equity secu-
rities" registered under the Exchange Act.13  Equity swaps are gener-
ally not considered securities, nor are they registered under the
Exchange Act, so they are not covered.
136
If a derivatives transaction is financially material, it might be cap-
tured as part of the quarterly umbrella Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A)
disclosure requirement. 137
In particular, MD&A disclosure includes various "off-balance sheet
arrangements," defined to include "[a]ny obligation.., under a con-
tract that would be accounted for as a derivative instrument." 18 This
term would include equity derivatives. However, MD&A disclosure is
required only for
off-balance sheet arrangements that have or are reasonably likely to have
a current or future effect on the registrant's financial condition, changes
in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, liquid-
ity, capital expenditures or capital resources that is material to investors.1 39
1 Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Oth-
ers, Securities Act Release No. 8160, Exchange Act Release No. 46,980, 67 Fed. Reg.
77,594, 77,604 (proposed Dec. 10, 2002).
134 Regulation S-K, Item 703, 17 C.F.R. § 229.703 (2007); Purchases of Certain Eq-
uity Securities by the Issuer and Others, Securities Act Release No. 8335, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,766, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,952 (Nov. 10, 2003).
135 Regulation S-K, Item 703, 17 C.F.R. § 229.703(a) (2007).
136 "Security-based swap agreements" are not considered securities under Securities
Act § 2A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b-l(b) (2000), and Exchange Act § 3A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
78c-1 (b) (2000). Item 703 deals with a company's purchases of shares and related equity
securities. Regulation S-K, Item 701, 17 C.F.R § 229.701 (2007), addresses sales of unregis-
tered securities. Item 701 might be implicated in some soft parking arrangements. How-
ever, we expect that the most likely forms will involve transactions in OTC equity deriva-
tives. In part, this reflects the nature of the underlying soft parking transactions; in part,
it reflects the reality that if a company can achieve the same soft parking end in two eco-
nomically similar ways, it will often prefer the form that avoids disclosure.
137 See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
175 (5th ed. 2004).
"8 Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) (4) (ii) (C), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (4) (ii) (C) (2007).
139 Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) (4) (i), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (4) (i) (2007).
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For the arrangements that concern us here, the primary impact is
not on the company's finances but on voting rights. Some of the
transactions we discuss above, if large enough, might have a financially
material impact-for example, a large long equity swap position. But
others would not. A share loan, for example, has no financial state-
ment impact. We know of no SEC statement suggesting that a poten-
tial effect on control alone would trigger MD&A disclosure.
Corporate soft parking might implicate other SEC disclosure rules
or principles, or general antifraud provisions. But the analysis is even
muddier. A company must file a Form 8-K on the occurrence of cer-
tain events, generally within four business days after occurrence. One
such occurrence is when the company enters into a "material defini-
tive agreement not made in the ordinary course of business" or any
material amendment thereof.1 40 If so, Item 1.01 requires the company
to provide information about the agreement. This requirement would
likely capture a single equity swap contract, if it was large enough to
be "material." How large that is, we can't be sure. Whether it cap-
tures a material effect on voting power, without a material effect on
the company's finances, is uncertain. Whether Item 1.01 captures the
gradual accumulation of a position, through many smaller transac-
tions, is also unclear. Nor do we know how much the company must
say, if it reports anything.
Broad SEC disclosure principles and antifraud provisions are simi-
larly unhelpful. Under both the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) and the Exchange Act, companies are required to provide "such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."14' These general principles provide
little guidance as to when or how a soft parking transaction would
need to be disclosed.14
2
Stock exchange rules are no more helpful. The NYSE requires
listed companies to notify it quarterly if the company acquires or dis-
140 SEC Form 8-K, Item 1.01 (a) (2006).
141 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20 (2007).
142 The Rule 10b-5 ban on insider trading covers corporate repurchases of shares,
and presumably applies as well to the equity swaps hypothetical. A corporation's knowl-
edge of the "true" distribution of votes may well be inside information. However, insider
trading liability rests on the same materiality requirement that underlies the company's
public filings. Moreover, the usual insider trading rule is "disclose or abstain." Here, the
counterparty will often have the same information as the company. It thus seems unlikely
that insider trading rules will have much impact on corporate soft parking.
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poses of its shares. The timing is different than for SEC rules, but the
rule appears to reach only shares, not derivatives. 143 Companies must
also notify the Exchange if the available public float is diminished "by
the deposit of stock under a voting trust agreement, or other deposit
agreements."'"4 This language could perhaps be stretched to cover
share loans, but even if so stretched, disclosure is only to the Ex-
change, not to the public. The NYSE and NASDAQ require compa-
nies to timely disclose information that may affect security values or
influence investment decisions, such as stock buyback programs.145
But whether this general disclosure principle reaches corporate de-
coupling is unclear.
Corporate soft parking is not, to our knowledge, currently dis-
closed. This might mean it doesn't happen. It could also mean that it
occurs but is outside-or is deemed by companies to be outside-
current disclosure rules.
2. Corporate Decoupling: Disclosure Proposal
For shareholders, we propose disclosure of both voting ownership
and economic ownership, partly to reflect the practical reality that an
economic-only owner often has de facto access to votes when needed.
For 13D filers, this disclosure would be on a close to real-time basis
(within ten days after crossing the 5% threshold), and would prompt
reporting of changes thereafter.146 Schedule 13D also requires filers
to attach pertinent agreements.
For corporations, we propose that they disclose significant transac-
tions in their shares or equity derivatives, and any share borrowing or
lending, following the 13D pattern. To ensure close to real-time dis-
closure, initial reporting would be on Form 8-K, with follow-up peri-
odic reporting on Forms 10-Q and 10-K. Relevant agreements would
be attached to these filings. Form 8-K is generally required to be filed
within four business days after a triggering event, which is roughly
comparable to Schedule 13D; we would not change this timing.
More specifically, one could revise Form 8-K, Item 1.01, to specify
that the acquisition of voting or economic ownership, or the borrow-
ing or lending of shares, beyond some threshold amount (perhaps
143 NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual § 204.25 (2007).
144 Id. § 204.09.
145 Id. § 201.00; NASDAQ Marketplace Rule IM-4120 (2007).
146 See Exchange Act Rule 13d-1, Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-1 (a) (2007).
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1%) by the corporation should be disclosed, and relevant agreements
attached as exhibits.147 As for shareholders, voting ownership would
be determined in accordance with Schedule 13D precepts, while eco-
nomic ownership would be determined in accordance with section 16
precepts. Economic ownership would be measured in the same crude
manner we propose for shareholder disclosure, ignoring option deltas.
D. Reporting Shares Lent and Voted on Form 13F
In Part IV.C, we suggest that regulators should encourage, but not
require, share lenders to recall and vote shares on record dates. In
Decoupling I, we proposed that Form 13F filings by institutional inves-
tors should disclose their share lending and borrowing on record
dates. We also proposed that 13F filers (and other periodic filers such
as mutual funds) report any occasions where they cast substantially
more votes than their economic ownership. To limit the reporting
burden for filers who engage in ordinary hedging activities, we would
require disclosure only if a filer cast a number of votes which ex-
ceeded its economic ownership by at least 0.5% (or some other
threshold amount) of a company's outstanding shares.
We propose here somewhat expanded disclosure: if an institution
owns shares in a company on a record date, it should disclose in its
next Form 13F filing its total economic ownership (including coupled
assets); the number of potentially votable shares (shares held directly
or in street name), the number of shares lent, the number of shares
borrowed, and the number voted. This would provide a fuller picture
of the institution's voting (including empty voting), borrowing, and
lending activity. We would not require investors to vote their shares,
merely to disclose whether they had done so. To limit the disclosure
burden, we would allow several exceptions:
(1) An institution would not need to report economic owner-
ship below a threshold dollar amount, or a threshold frac-
tion of its total assets, if that ownership reflects long or
short positions in broad market indices. For example, an
institution which holds S&P 500 Index futures would not
need to adjust its reported ownership of every company in
the index.
147 An exception to the requirement to attach related agreements might be ap-
propriate for derivatives transactions that follow a standard, publicly available form
contract.
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(2) An institution would not need to report share borrowing
or lending if the net amount fell below a threshold
amount, measured as a fraction of its holdings, the com-
pany's outstanding shares, or both.
(3) An institution would not need to report number of shares
voted if its holdings of potentially votable shares fell below
a threshold amount, measured as a fraction of its holdings
or the company's outstanding shares.
(4) We would require only omnibus disclosure of voting-
were the shares voted or not? We would not impose the
additional burden of reporting how many shares were
voted on each agenda item.
This disclosure may give institutional investors incentives to vote
the shares they economically own, and only the shares they economi-
cally own, to avoid the potential embarrassment of being a known
empty voter. These disclosures would likely prompt some institutions
to improve their practices with respect to exercising voting rights, in-
cluding ensuring that they can recall and vote shares if they 
want to. 141
Currently, most institutions treat share lending and proxy voting
as distinct activities. 49 Sometimes, they discover too late that shares
which they planned to vote have instead been lent by their share lend-
ing office or a lending agent. One such incident was prominent
enough to merit inclusion in our decoupling list (see Table 1, supra).
In 2001, Fidelity and Morgan Stanley, together holding 10% of Tele-
com Italia, led a campaign against a takeover offer by Pirelli. They
discovered, however, that they held only 1% of the votes; their remain-
ing shares had been lent and could not be recalled in time for the
shareholder meeting, at which the Pirelli bid was approved. Who
voted the shares is unknown.5°
148 We offer a specific reform proposal on share recall procedures infra in Part
IV.C.2. There may be additional benefits to greater transparency with respect to stock
lending and borrowing. For instance, in September 2007, criminal charges were
brought against former stock loan employees at a number of brokerage firms; prosecu-
tors allege that because prices in the share loan market were so obscure, the employees
could rip off their own firms by arranging for the firms to overpay when borrowing
shares. See Floyd Norris, Stock Loans Are No Place for Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007,
at Cl.
149 See Inst'l S'holder Servs., ISS Share Lending Flash Survey (2007) (PowerPoint
presentation provided by Diana Bourke to Henry Hu) (discussing survey findings on
institutional investors' voting and lending policies).
150 Kirchmaier & Grant (2005), supra note 112, at 18-22. There were rumors that
the votes may have found their way to Pirelli.
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It may be useful to compare our proposal to the SEC's rule requir-
ing mutual funds to disclose how they voted on proposals presented at
shareholder meetings. 51 We would not require disclosure of how the
13F filer voted, only whether it voted or not. However, the mutual fund
rule requires no disclosure of number of shares voted; we would re-
quire this disclosure. In short, the mutual fund rule requires disclo-
sure of voting direction, but not magnitude. In theory a fund could
own 3 million shares, vote one of them for a proposal, abstain for the
rest, and report that it had supported the proposal. Our proposal re-
quires the reverse: magnitude, but not direction. Mutual funds would
be subject to both rules.
IV. RESPONSES TO EMPTY VOTING: BEYOND DISCLOSURE REFORM
A. Overview
Enhanced disclosure may be a sufficient response to hidden own-
ership, which would no longer be hidden. It will also open windows
into the share lending market and into the extent of empty voting.
Disclosure is likely to reduce the incidence of empty voting. Share-
holders and firms will not always do publicly what they might do in se-
cret. Soft parkees, derivatives dealers, and other facilitators would in-
cur increased reputational risk. At ZKB, for example, the CEO and
the head of derivatives trading lost their jobs and suffered front page
ignominy, in significant part due to ZKB's role in the hidden attack on
Sulzer. 52
But some firms, shareholders, and third-party facilitators will bar-
rel ahead. In Hungary, MOL made no secret of lending 40% of its
shares to friendly local banks to fend off OMV's takeover bid.153 In the
United States, firms have publicly placed mostly empty votes with
ESOP plans as a takeover defense. In Korea, Hyundai Elevator's initial
hard parking of shares in Hyundai Merchant Marine remained in
place, even though later disclosed; and Hyundai Elevator later openly
151 17 C.F.R. § 270.30bl-4 (2007); SEC Form N-PX (2003). For studies of the im-
pact of this mutual fund rule, see Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy
Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007); Martijn Cremers & Roberta
Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Vot-
ing Disclosure Regulation (Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=982493.
152 We discuss Sulzer, and ZKB's role, supra in Part II.A.
153 We discuss OMV's bid for MOL supra in Part I.C.2.
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expanded the parking arrangement with a second counterparty.'5
Disclosure will also likely do little to deter the use of decoupling to
avoid mandatory bid rules.
Sometimes, too, disclosure will come too late to matter. Consider
the Henderson Investments scenario described in DecouplingL One or
more hedge funds borrowed shares just before the record date for a
merger vote, voted them against an apparently beneficial transaction,
and then sold the shares short before the meeting date, profiting
while defeating the transaction. After-the-fact disclosure would not
have changed its ability to profit at other shareholders' expense.55
Or consider the inability of Pershing Square, a major economic
owner of Sears Canada through equity swaps, to obtain the matched
shares in Sears Canada that were held by Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotia-
bank). In substance, Scotiabank was an empty voter, akin to a nomi-
nal holder, while Pershing Square was the economic owner. Or, per-
haps Sears Holdings was the true empty voter. The Ontario Securities
Commission blocked Scotiabank from voting, finding that Sears Hold-
ing had offered side consideration to Scotiabank. It would otherwise
have voted, despite Pershing Square's public complaints. 56
As we discussed in Decoupling I, there are circumstances in which
decoupling can be beneficial, and in which a suitably regulated mar-
ket for votes, decoupled from shares, could work reasonably well.1 57 It
is also hard to regulate an activity that can take many shifting forms.
We therefore offered a menu of regulatory approaches, but made no
specific recommendations. The developments since, discussed in Part
1I, suggest that we should be less cautious. There is need, we now be-
lieve, for measured regulatory responses to address the risks posed by
decoupling. Moreover, it is likely better to regulate sensibly and gen-
tly now, before a crisis hits, than to wait and risk a postcrisis overreac-
tion. Below, we discuss three families of strategies.151
154 We discuss Hyundai Elevator's use of decoupling to avoid Korea's holding
company rules infra in Part V.A.
155 We discuss the Henderson Land case in Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Ver-
sion) (2006), supra note 1, at 834-35.
156 We discuss Pershing Square-Sears Canada in Hu and Black, Decoupling I (Finance
Version) (2007), supra note 1, at 352.
157 Hu and Black, Decoupling! (Finance Version) (2007), supra note 1, at 354-55.
5 Shaun P. Martin and Frank Partnoy have proposed eliminating all voting rights
for anyone who hedges even part of their interest, but they did not propose specific
implementation strategies. See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005
U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 793-94. We discuss and criticize their proposal in Hu & Black, De-
coupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1 at 888-90. A subsequent work pro-
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One family focuses on voting fights (Section B): when should the
voting rights of an empty voter be limited based on economic owner-
ship? We propose amending corporate law to provide constrained
power for corporations to amend their charters to limit empty voting.
We would constrain this power in a number of ways, including major-
ity of minority approval of the charter amendment, to reduce the risk
that insiders will propose amendments that block the empty voting
techniques favored by outsiders, while permitting those favored by in-
siders. We develop a proposal for an "attestation" charter provision,
which would require major shareholders to attest to their economic
ownership, and would limit voting rights above the attested level. We
would also amend corporate law to bar voting by shareholders with
negative economic ownership. And we would extend current rules
governing record holders to also apply to derivatives dealers who hold
matched shares to hedge a short equity derivatives position held by an
investor. We would generally require the dealers to pass voting rights
through to their counterparty, who is the economic owner.
A second family of strategies focuses on supply and demand forces
relating to the new vote buying (Section C). We recommend that
regulators provide a safe harbor to allow institutional investors to re-
call and vote lent shares without risking a fiduciary duty lawsuit for not
lending the shares instead. (Recall from Part III that our disclosure
proposal would require 13F filers to disclose whether they voted or
lent their shares.) Regulators should encourage, and perhaps require,
large institutional lenders to develop the ability to recall lent shares on
short notice. And record owners who have lent shares held in street
name should be required to recall a number of shares sufficient, based
on past experience, to honor the expected number of client voting in-
structions.
Third, the mechanics of shareholder voting need rethinking (Sec-
tion D). Our proposal on limiting share loans by record owners
should reduce the problem of "overvoting." 159 If overvotes still occur,
poses to reduce the gap between the record date and meeting date, and also suggests a
second look at time-phased voting. See Charles M. Nathan, "Empty Voting" and Other
Fault Lines Undermining Shareholder Democracy: The New Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds,
CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 1, 8. On "overvoting" and other vot-
ing slippages due to technical problems in the voting architecture, see Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting 28-32 (Working Paper, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007065.
159 Overvoting involves a record owner which, having lent some of its shares, seeks
to cast more votes than its remaining votable shares. See Kahan & Rock (2007), supra
note 158, at 31.
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state law should be amended to allow companies to honor the prop-
erly cast votes (counting yes and no votes proportionately to the votes
cast). Voting agendas should be available before the record date.
And dividend and voting record dates should be separated.
Some larger changes in the voting architecture are also appropri-
ate in an electronic age, and would improve the quality of voting.
Economic owners should vote directly, instead of the current clumsy
and often faulty system in which record owners solicit voting instruc-
tions and then try to follow them. And the time gap between the re-
cord date and the meeting date should be dramatically shortened.
We assume familiarity with the menu of possible approaches we
presented in Decoupling I, and with the current voting system.160 We
focus on specific proposals, which we believe should be adopted in the
near term, and on amendments to U.S. rules. We address European
reforms in related work. 1
61
B. Voting Rights
1. Direct Limits on Voting Rights
One way to address empty voting is to limit the voting rights of
shareholders who hold greater voting than economic ownership. This
solution may seem obvious in extreme cases, such as the negative eco-
nomic ownership. But that extreme case aside, when it is appropriate
to limit voting rights is as yet unclear. For complex positions, how to
measure economic ownership can also be unclear. We therefore pro-
pose an incremental approach. Delaware (and other states) should
amend its corporate law to permit firms to modify their charters to
limit voting rights based on a shareholder's economic ownership.1
62
This will permit firms to experiment with different approaches. Be-
1W For detailed overviews of the current system, see John C. Wilcox &JohnJ. Pur-
cell III, "Street Name" Registration & the Proxy Solicitation Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 12-1 (Amy L. Goodman &John F. Olson
eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2003); Kahan & Rock (2007), supra note 158, at 4-39.
161 Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling (2008), supra note 4.
162 One could argue that this power is already conveyed by a general provision
such as section 212(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which provides,
"Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation .... each stockholder
shall be entitled to I vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2001). However, one could also view this provision as
conveying power to specify in the charter the voting rights conveyed by each share, not
power to condition voting rights on attributes of the shareholder, such as whether the
shareholder also holds coupled or related non-host assets.
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low, we discuss the general proposal, and develop one possible im-
plementation, in which large shareholders would attest to their eco-
nomic ownership when they vote.
The key risk for a charter amendment is that insiders will propose
amendments that allow decoupling techniques likely to be used by in-
siders, while restricting techniques likely to be used by outsiders. This
risk is especially high for "midstream" charter amendments by already
public companies. 163 We would therefore limit the scope of permissi-
ble charter provisions in a number of ways. First, a midstream charter
amendment should be approved by a majority vote of nonaffiliated
shareholders in a separate vote, not tied to any other agenda item.16
Second, any charter provision should be facially neutral-it should
not exempt particular classes of persons or particular levels of owner-
ship, should not permit case-by-case exemptions, and should not de-
pend on the period for which shares have been held. Time-phased
rules are a familiar way to privilege insiders, who are more likely to
meet the time restrictions. 165 Third, the rules should not be puni-
tive-a shareholder should not lose a large number of votes because
of a small disparity between economic and voting ownership. Fourth,
the rules should permit holding shares in street name, as long as the
record holder votes based on instructions from an economic owner.
Fifth, there should be an expedited procedure for shareholders to ver-
ify, before voting, whether their votes will count. There should be no
ex post "gotchas," in which a firm's insiders deny votes to a particular
shareholder and thereby win a close vote they would otherwise have
lost. Sixth, judges should have equitable jurisdiction to uphold the
spirit of the charter provision and allow (deny) voting rights in situa-
163 On the risks posed by midstream charter amendments, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Char-
ter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1820, 1823 (1989); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 567-68 (1990). A major-
ity of minority requirement prior to going public is not feasible, but also not important.
Most scholars believe that a pre-IPO charter provision is not likely to be seriously ineffi-
cient, because if it were, the insiders would expect to receive a lower price for their
shares. See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 91 (2001).
64 This proposal draws, in spirit, from the general "self-enforcing" approach to
corporate law proposed in Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
165 NYSE rules do not allow time-phased voting. NYSE Euronext, Listed Company
Manual § 313(A) (2007).
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tions where the voter did (did not) have matching economic and vot-
ing ownership.'6
Shareholder attestation offers an approach that satisfies these cri-
teria and avoids the problems with specifying particular types of per-
mitted or not-permitted decoupling, or developing a detailed measure
of economic ownership. A company could adopt a charter provision
requiring major shareholders, say those holding over 1% of its shares,
to attest when voting that the voted shares do not exceed their eco-
nomic ownership by a specified percentage-say, by 20%. In comput-
ing economic ownership, we would let shareholders not count general
hedges (long company X, but also short a broad index that includes
company X). For simplicity, the attestation would involve only cou-
pled assets, not related non-host assets. This relatively soft approach
will reduce the number of instances in which votes are disallowed, as
well as related transaction costs, while still ensuring that votes are gen-
erally cast by people with incentives to increase firm value. Since for
some derivative positions, economic ownership can vary with share
price, the attestation should be as of the record date.
This proposal assumes adoption of our separate proposal that
economic owners should vote directly, rather than indirectly by giving
instructions to record owners. If record owners vote, the attestation
obligation would follow the voting rights they pass to economic owners.
This proposal would put the burden on the shareholder to moni-
tor its own economic ownership, and cast only the number of votes to
which it is entitled. The company could not by itself go behind the
attestation. But most attesting shareholders will also be required to
file federal ownership disclosure reports under our integrated owner-
ship disclosure proposal, including an ex post recitation of instances
in which they cast empty votes. There are federal criminal penalties
for filing false reports, which constrain false federal filings. And it
seems unlikely that many shareholders will falsely attest to economic
ownership when voting, then truthfully report a divergence between
voting and economic ownership in a later federal filing. So the attes-
tations should be credible. If an attestation is false and this is later
IM For empty voting by insiders-directly or through the corporation-the courts
may already have the power to intervene. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003), the Delaware courts
"have remained assiduous in carefully reviewing any board actions designed to inter-
fere with or impede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders, es-
pecially in an election of directors." Our proposal would ensure that the courts have
this power for insiders, and would extend it to voting by outsiders.
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discovered, the courts can decide on a case-by-case basis whether to
require a new vote and what sanctions to impose.
We would address the situation where one person or entity con-
trols several others who each hold shares in the same company, by re-
quiring parent-level attestation. Otherwise, the attestation rule could
be evaded. 16
We would apply the attestation rule only to large shareholders for
several reasons. First, transaction costs will likely outweigh benefits for
smaller shareholders. Second, smaller shareholders who hold more
votes than economic ownership are likely to be simply hedging, not
engaging in deliberate empty voting. Third, the empty votes of small
shareholders are unlikely to affect many voting outcomes. Finally, ad-
ditional burdens on individual investors will encourage even more
passivity.
It is possible, but we think unlikely, that attestation, or another
plausible, facially neutral charter amendment, would require chang-
ing NYSE rules, which state that voting rights "cannot be disparately
reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance."
' 6 8
The NYSE states that its voting rights policy "will be flexible, recogniz-
ing that both the capital markets and the circumstances and needs of
listed companies change over time."'69 It is more likely that attestation
would require technical changes to implicate the federal proxy rules,
given the SEC's broad power to regulate the proxy process, including
the form of proxies. "0
Disallowing votes raises a technical concern. One would not want
disallowance of voting rights to cause companies to have trouble ob-
taining a quorum. Nor would one want disallowance to create implicit
no votes, based on the approval needed for a particular decision. For
example, a merger or a charter amendment requires approval by a
majority of the outstanding shares. Disallowed votes should not count
as no votes. A natural solution is to exclude nonvotable shares in de-
termining the number of outstanding shares, in the same way that
167 Parent could, for example, arrange for subsidiary 1 to be long I million shares
of company X, while subsidiary 2 is short 1 million shares. Parent is thus fully hedged,
yet if attestation is not at the parent level, subsidiary 1 could vote its 1 million shares.
168 NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual § 313(A) (2007). Examples of such
plans include time-phased voting (longer-term shareholders get more votes per share)
and capped voting (a cap on the number of votes by a single shareholder).
1 Id.
170 Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000); Exchange Act Rule 14a-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a4 (2007).
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Treasury shares, or shares held by a company's subsidiaries, are not
treated as outstanding.1
The difficulty comes in identifying nonvotable shares. One needs,
in effect, to count the number of shares in each of five categories in-
stead of the usual four: (1) yes votes; (2) no votes; (3) abstain (nei-
ther yes nor no, but counts toward a quorum); (4) non-votes of vo-
table shares (does not count toward a quorum); and (5) the new
category of disallowed votes (reduces the number of effectively out-
standing shares). One approach would be to require shareholders
who hold disallowed votes, when they vote and attest to economic
ownership, to also attest to how many shares they hold for which votes
are disallowed. 172
2. Voting with Negative Economic Ownership
We also believe that corporate law should intervene directly and
bar voting in the extreme case of negative economic ownership. Pos-
sible holdings of related non-host assets aside, negative economic
ownership gives the shareholder incentives to vote against the interests
of other shareholders. 
173
Corporate law does not generally police the reasons why share-
holders vote as they do. Shareholders can vote based on their private
interests, even if those diverge from corporate interests. For instance,
employee shareholders can vote to preserve their jobs, at the expense
of firm value, and diversified shareholders can vote to benefit their
overall portfolio, rather than the company's interests, and a control-
ling shareholder can vote against a merger proposal that creates
171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (2001). On the complexities in determining
whether a particular proposal has passed or received majority support, see Janet Fisher
& Mary Alcock, Voting at Annual Meetings, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS CORP. GOvERN-
ANCE REP. (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, N.Y., N.Y.), June-Sept. 2007, at 14,
available at http://www.clearygottlieb.com/files/tbl s47Details%5CFileUpload265%
5C759%5CCG%20M&A%20and%20corporate%202OGovernance%2OReport.pdf.
172 A potential concern with a charter amendment approach is that the general
potential for empty voting means that the vote on a charter amendment might itself be
bought. We think this is an acceptable risk. Empty voting is still the exception and not
the rule, and it is not clear why an attestation rule would be controversial enough to
attract an empty voting effort, whether to support or defeat it.
173 We need not specify here the precise nature of those interests or of the com-
pany value at stake. For a discussion of three conceptions of the corporate objective
and differences between actual and blissful shareholder wealth maximization and be-
tween shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder welfare maximization, see
Henry T. C. Hu, Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder
Wealth Maximization, "J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1996, at 39, 40-43, 48-50.
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higher dollar value for all shareholders, itself included, to preserve its
own control. The primary exception is the fiduciary duty of a control-
ling shareholder to treat minority shareholders fairly in a freezeout or
other self-dealing transaction. 7 4 The freedom to vote to favor one's
private interests is largely taken for granted, rather than seen as need-
ingjustification.
One can readily develop several justifications. First, if most share-
holders have incentives to vote in ways that are likely to increase value
and the cases where they do not are uncommon, it may not be worth-
while to worry about limiting the power to vote one's private interests.
Second, it will often be hard to determine a shareholder's reasons for
voting. Third, allowing controlling shareholders to vote as they please
may offer rough justice on access to private benefits. Corporate law
limits self-dealing, albeit not perfectly. Yet if private benefits were too
low, controllers might decline to retain control, to the detriment of
other shareholders, or might not take the firm public in the first
place. 7 5 Fourth, there is value in speed and finality in determining
voting outcomes.
None of these justifications is compelling for a shareholder who
holds a negative economic ownership (a net short position) in com-
pany X We propose that state corporate law should presume that
such a shareholder is voting against the interests of other shareholders
and disallow voting rights, thus leaving the decision to be made by
other shareholders. The presumption could be rebuttable, to allow
for the case in which a shareholder could show that his overall eco-
nomic interest, including related non-host assets, was positive. Or it
could be a flat rule, on the grounds that holding voting while holding
negative net economic ownership is already uncommon, and the ex-
ception to the exception-negative economic ownership yet positive
overall economic interest-is rare enough not to be worth addressing.
Such a rule is analogous to the rules in many countries, though
not the United States, which require majority of minority approval for
174 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMEN-
TARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ch. 12.10 (2d ed. 2007).
For discussion of a counterexample, see William A. Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr., BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 168-70 (10th ed.
2007). Some other jurisdictions impose greater duties on controlling shareholders.
See, e.g., Gambotto v. W.C.P. Ltd. (1995), 182 C.L.R. 432 (Austl.) (requiring majority
shareholders to act in the best interests of their company); GAMBOyrO v WCP LTD: ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE REGULATION (Ian M. Ramsay ed., 1996).
175 See Jens Dammann, Majority Freezeouts 16-17 (Univ. of Tex. Law Sch., Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 114, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013082.
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freezeouts or related party transactions, thus limiting voting rights to
unconflicted shareholders. Indeed, even without a legislative
amendment, one can imagine courts using their equitable powers to
disallow voting by shareholders with negative economic ownership.
This situation is analogous to cases limiting voting by directors whose
personal interests conflict with the corporation's interests.176 Current
case law is limited to directors and officers, who have an explicit fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation. But one can imagine the courts creat-
ing a limited fiduciary duty on the part of shareholders not to vote in
this situation, much as they have created a limited fiduciary duty of
controlling shareholders in a freezeout.
Our proposal to bar voting by persons with negative economic in-
terests is similar in spirit to the Hedge Fund Working Group proposal
to bar voting of shares in which market participants had no economic
interest."' The group felt that this might result in votes being exer-
cised against the best interests of the lender. In contrast, our proposal
only applies to those with negative overall economic interests. How-
ever, our proposal is not limited to share lending.1
7
8
3. Voting by Record Owners: Extension to OTC Equity Derivatives
The case of empty voting by shareholders with zero economic
ownership deserves special attention because it is common and, in
part, already regulated. Record ownership decouples economic from
voting ownership. Our legal system has responded by partially recou-
pling the two. Economic owners can provide voting instructions,
which record owners must follow; if no instructions are given, the re-
cord owner can vote on routine matters but not major matters.
These rules can provide precedent for a broader effort to recon-
nect voting rights to economic ownership when financial innovation
has severed them. Consider, for example, a derivatives dealer who
176 See Warner Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal
Business Activities of Directors, 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 189, 189 (1941) (discussing the restric-
tions of corporate directors' "freedom to engage in purely personal business activi-
ties"); cf Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvich, 92 P.2d 316, 320 (Mont. 1939) (address-
ing the situation of an outside director who was a competitor).
177 HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP (2007), supra note 129, at 61.
178 Jonathan Cohen, Negative Voting: Why It Destroys Shareholder Value and a Proposal
To Prevent It, 45 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2008), proposes a private right of ac-
tion for shareholders harmed by voting with negative economic interest. In our view,
this remedy is too mild, even assuming effective disclosure, because harm will often be
hard to show.
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holds matched shares to hedge the short side of an equity swap. As we
discussed, under common market practices, the long swap holder of-
ten has informal rights either to unwind the swap and obtain and vote
the matching shares, or to instruct the dealer on how to vote. Disclo-
sure aside, these informal rights are analogous to the rules governing
record owners. We would make them formal: Dealers who hold
matched shares to hedge a short equity swap position with a known
counterparty should be treated the same as record owners, and should
pass voting rights on to the counterparty. Similar rules should apply
in other situations in which a dealer holds matched shares to hedge
another equity derivatives position where a single counterparty with
economic ownership can be identified.
Some caveats and exceptions: This proposal would not require
dealers to hedge in any particular way; it would apply only if they
hedged through matched shares. This proposal would not apply if a
dealer hedges its risks on a portfolio basis rather than a transaction
basis "9 One might need a de minimis rule, to ensure that a dealer
can't vote a million shares by holding one share unhedged. Finally, if
the counterparty is the issuer of the shares or an affiliate of the issuer,
the dealer should simply not vote.
Record owners currently need not investigate whether the person
for whom they hold shares is hedged. We would not change this. Re-
cord owners should pass votes on to apparent economic owners based
on their own knowledge. We would rely on the provisions discussed
above (charter amendments and denial of voting rights to persons
with negative net economic interest) to operate directly on the appar-
ent economic owner.
This transfer of voting rights from derivatives dealers to their cus-
tomers would limit investors' ability to hold large-scale hidden
(morphable) ownership, even under existing U.S. disclosure rules.
Reporting on Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G is largely triggered by ac-
cess to voting rights. If derivatives dealers transferred voting rights to
long equity swap holders, the holders would have clear rights to the votes
on the matched shares, so these shares would count toward the 5% trig-
ger. However, the transfer rules would not affect reporting on Form 13F.
This proposal would also substantially limit corporate soft parking.
179 For example, a dealer may hold shares to hedge an overall book of options po-
sitions, with calls held by some clients and puts held by others. In this situation, eco-
nomic ownership will be split, and there may be no obvious person to pass voting rights
to. The rights should then remain with the derivatives dealer. Our proposal focuses
on situations where the locus of economic ownership is clear.
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Consider next other cases of zero economic ownership. The
shareholder may not have bad incentives, it merely has no incentives.
Should state law prevent voting? Our answer is a cautious "no." In ef-
fect, we need to draw a line somewhere between two classes of situa-
tions: (1) positive economic ownership, where the default rule is the
right to vote, but we would allow companies to limit empty voting
through a charter provision; and (2) negative economic ownership,
where we believe the case against voting is clear enough so that the
corporate law should bar voting. Zero economic ownership (or, a bit
more broadly, economic ownership that is small in relation to voting
rights) falls right on the line. We address above zero economic own-
ership by record owners and derivatives dealers. We would let the re-
maining instances lie.
4. Voting by Record Owners: Proportional Voting if No Instructions
Record owners sometimes receive more voting instructions from
economic owners than they can honor-which creates the overvoting
problem. But often they receive fewer instructions than they hold
votes. Broker-dealers are barred from voting for many important de-
cisions; banks are not covered by these rules but apparently routinely
do not vote unless instructed. The NYSE has proposed to extend the
ban on broker-dealer voting to routine director elections effective for
annual meetings in 2008; at this writing, the SEC is reviewing this pro-
posal.180 When not barred from voting, record owners can vote as they
see fit, and usually support management's recommendations.
An alternative approach would be for record owners, when they
have more votable shares than instructions, to vote all shares in pro-
portion to the instructions they receive (assuming, as is usually the
case, that the instructions represent a reasonable fraction of the
shares). This would somewhat overweight the instructions that share-
holders convey, but creates no obvious incentive problems. At the
180 For the current rules, see NYSE Euronext, NYSE Rule 452 (2003), available at
http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp-l_2&manual=
nyse/nyse-rules/nyse-rules. For the proposed rule change, see NYSE EURONEXT, RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG-REPORT.pdf;
NYSE Euronext, August 27, 2007 Addendum to the Report and Recommendations of the Proxy
Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange Dated June 5, 2006, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWGAddendumfinal.pdf. For the current status of the
proposal, see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Briefing Paper, Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechan-
ics (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/
proxyvotingbrief.htn.
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margin, the prospect of overweighted voting might induce more eco-
nomic owners to vote. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association-a trade association representing most major securities
firms, banks and asset managers-encourages its members to adopt
proportional voting; some major broker-dealers have already done so.l8l
In keeping with our overall incremental approach, we would limit
this approach to instances where broker-dealers can currently vote.
But it may well be extendable to elections in which broker-dealers cur-
rently can vote only shares on which they receive voting instructions.
5. Empty Voting by Insiders
Directors, officers, and controlling shareholders can also engage
in empty voting, either directly or by inducing corporate action. We
have already discussed ESOPs. The fiduciary duty rules and cases
which apply there also apply to other efforts by insiders to use empty
voting to resist a takeover bid. 
2
Here, we address insider empty voting outside of the takeover con-
text. Corporate officers and directors are fiduciaries, so the duty of
loyalty offers a natural framework to discuss this practice. The greater
rigor with which courts police shareholder elections outside the take-
over context makes it possible, even likely, that company officers or
directors would breach the duty of loyalty if they used corporate assets
or the promise of future business to procure votes. In the Hewlett v.
Hewlett-Packard proxy fight, for example, major shareholders, led by
Walter Hewlett, opposed a merger between Compaq and HP, on the
grounds that HP was overpaying. HP's managers barely obtained a
majority shareholder vote for the merger. Hewlett then sued, claim-
ing that HP's management had procured votes from Deutsche Bank
through promises or threats related to future business dealings between
the two companies.18 3 HP's managers defended on the grounds that they
had made no promises or threats, but had merely sought vigorously to
present their case on the merits. Chancellor Chandler concurred.
8 4
181 See Letter from Donald D. Kittell, Executive Vice President, Sec. Indus. & Fin.
Mkts. Ass'n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 2 (Mar. 30, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-07/s70307-20.pdf.
182 See supra Part I.C.3.
183 Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 818091, at *1, *8-9
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002).
184 See id. at *9 ("During the conference call [between Hewlett-Packard and
Deutsche Bank], no one from HP used any threats or inducements regarding future
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If HP's managers had procured votes through a promise or threat
relating to future business, that would presumably both violate man-
agement's fiduciary duty and constitute classic vote buying. Both sides
in the HP case assumed this was improper. We believe that the same
conclusion should apply to corporate stock parking, whether hard or
soft. The remedy should be that the counterparty should not vote.
Suppose now that the insiders engage in empty voting directly,
rather than through parking by the company. Partially empty voting
by insiders is already common; many executives who hold zero-cost
collars or other hedges are partially empty voters. Our tentative view
is that if directors and officers engaged in new vote buying for their
personal accounts in contemplation of a specific vote, say, by buying
shares while hedging, the breach of fiduciary duty is the same as with
corporate soft parking-the insiders are controlling votes on shares
they do not economically own-and the outcome should be the same.
What then if the insider holds a partially empty position, estab-
lished some time ago, without regard to a particular vote? We would,
for now, leave this situation to be addressed, if at all, by corporations
themselves. To be sure, the ability to buy votes in advance of a par-
ticular vote might lead insiders to do so, and then propose no such
amendment. Thus, if large scale insider hedging becomes common,
this issue might need to be revisited.
C. Strategies Affecting the Share Lending Market
1. The Importance of Share Lending and Recent Industry
Developments
A second family of regulatory interventions would focus on supply
and demand for share borrowing and lending. Share lending plays a
key role in decoupling. First, the very act of borrowing decouples
economic ownership from voting ownership. Tax differences between
the return on shares and the mirror return paid by the borrower to
the lender aside, borrowing of shares is really borrowing of votes. In
record date capture, a share borrower simply keeps the shares and votes
them. Other empty voting strategies often rely on share lending as well.
In particular, the strategy (buy shares, hold short equity swaps) will of-
ten have as a counterparty a derivatives dealer who is short shares (hav-
ing borrowed them) and long the equity swap.
business relationships .... Instead, [HP's executives] argued HP's case entirely on the
merits.").
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The cost of share borrowing is quite low. A typical borrowing cost
is around 20 basis points per year, or less than 0.1 basis points
(0.001%) per day. Thus, unless prices are higher for borrowing on a
record date, one can borrow the votes on $1 billion of shares for less
than $10,000 ($1 billion x .001% = $10,000).
With regard to scale, the stock loan market is huge and growing.
In the United States alone, the volume of outstanding stock loans at
mid-year 2005 was about $1.5 trillion.'8 ' Most stocks can be borrowed.
During the second quarter of 2007, $3.6 trillion of U.S. equities were
available for borrowing from just 16 lending banks, based on a survey
116by the Risk Management Association (RMA). These shares repre-
sent roughly 17% of the combined market capitalization of the NYSE
and NASDAQ. 187 Additional shares would be available from other
sources, including broker-dealers who hold shares for retail investors
or hedge funds, and from institutional investors who run their own
lending programs. A knowledgeable source advised us, as a conserva-
tive "guesstimate," that, in normal (non-takeover) circumstances,
roughly 20% or more of the shares of a typical large U.S. publicly held
company can be borrowed. In the U.K, one source suggests that for
large firms in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index,
as much as 50% of their shares are generally borrowable.' 89
On the lending side, stock lenders know that their vote is unlikely
to swing an election. Moreover, lenders who recall shares on record
dates-thus forcing borrowers to find an alternate lender, perhaps at
a difficult time if other lenders also behave this way-are less reliable
lenders, and are likely to be chosen last when borrowers choose their
lenders from among a normally ample supply or to receive lower lend-
ing fees. To be sure, if enough institutions recalled and voted shares,
185 SeeJohn Hintze, Automation Has Greater Impact as Securities Lending Increases, SEC.
INDUS. NEWS, May 8, 2006, at 16, 33.
186 RMA Securities Lending Industry Composite, Averages for the Period: 2nd
Quarter 2007, available at http://rmahq.org/NR/rdonlyres/77B9BCC6-5FB2-4961-
884D-BAAB3ADAED2B/0/Survey2ndQtr2007.xls.
187 See FOCUS (World Fed'n of Exchs.), Sept. 2007, at 41, 42 tbl.1.1 (providing data
on market capitalization).
'8 Telephone Interview with Irving Klubeck, President, Sec. Lending Div., Sec.
Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass'n, and Managing Dir., Pershing LLC (Oct. 23, 2007).
189 Peter Butler, Founder & CEO, Governance for Owners, Address at the Interna-
tional Corporate Governance Network Conference: Creating Value-Building Trust
(July 7, 2006) (PowerPoint slides on file with authors) (providing data on shares bor-
rowed as a percentage of shares outstanding and as a percentage of borrowable shares;
one can combine the two percentages to estimate borrowable shares as a fraction of
shares outstanding).
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a separate market might develop for lending shares that would be re-
called on record dates, with a lower borrowing rate. Such a market
does not yet exist. A different balance of supply and demand might
also cause a spike in the price of borrowing on the record date, which
would then constrain demand, but that too has yet to happen.
2. Safe Harbor for Voting Instead of Lending; Lending Disclosure
How might we change the current equilibrium-in which share
borrowing for empty voting is easy and lender recalls of shares for vot-
ing are the exception-without significantly disrupting the valuable,
nonvoting reasons for share borrowing, including hedging and short-
selling?
Regulators already encourage institutions to recall and vote lent
shares. The SEC does so for mutual funds; the Department of Labor
does so for ERISA pension funds.' 90 But these are only nudges.
Moreover, the record date, and hence the need to decide whether to
recall shares, often occurs before the voting agenda is known. Indeed,
it sometimes takes effort even to learn the record date before it has
passed.' 9' These regulatory nudges appear to have limited effect on
lending behavior. They may, however, provide an implicit safe harbor
for institutions which prefer to vote their shares rather than lend
them, against a claim by their clients or beneficiaries that the institu-
tion breached its fiduciary duty by not maximizing lending income.
The reliability of the safe harbor is uncertain; we know of no cases
challenging decisions to vote shares instead of lending them, or vice
versa.
An initial step would be to create a firm regulatory safe harbor, for
all major classes of institutions, if they vote shares rather than lend
them. A safe harbor is appropriate because for major shareholders,
voting is plausibly socially optimal, even if not privately optimal for any
190 We discuss these efforts in Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006),
supra note 1, at 899-901.
191 Companies must inform record holders (under Exchange Act Rule 14a-13, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2007)) and exchanges (under exchange rules) of record dates in
advance. They normally do not provide advance notice to shareholders. However, in-
stitutions can learn record dates from stock exchanges (the NYSE publishes them in a
weekly circular) or from specialized services that provide this information. Jennifer E.
Bethel, Gang Hu & Qinghai Wang, Institutional Investor Activism: Evidence ftom Voting
and Daily Trading Around Mergers and Acquisitions 6-7 (Working Paper, 2007) (on file
with authors).
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one shareholder due to the low likelihood that one's vote will be de-
terminative.
A further disclosure step, which we recommended in Part III,
would be to require institutions to disclose the fraction of shares they
voted, could have voted but did not, and the fraction lent. This dis-
closure could create soft pressure on some institutions (especially mu-
tual funds and public pension funds) to vote instead of lend, or at
least to explain their lending decisions. 192
We do not recommend that regulators require institutions to recall
and vote lent shares. For many routine votes, this would impose costs,
for little benefit. Moreover, widespread recall of lent shares could
create an "artificial" squeeze on the supply of lendable shares, which
might undermine the market for short-selling and for hedging strate-
gies which employ borrowed shares. Also, many institutional investors
want to stay on good terms with company managers. Such a dynamic
could explain why, when acquirer shareholders must vote on acquisi-
tions, the acquisitions are almost invariably approved, even if stock
price reactions suggest that the acquirer has overpaid. 193 The fear that
mutual fund managers would be more likely to cast pro-management
votes if their votes were disclosed created controversy over SEC rules
which require this disclosure. 9 4  Institutions' willingness to be per-
suaded could help to explain why, when a vote is close, managers can
often round up just enough yes votes to win. 195 Meanwhile, public
pension funds are not beholden to companies, but can have political
motives. Thus, it is not clear that forcing institutions to vote is the
right approach, when the alternative might often be for the institu-
tions to lend shares to unconflicted hedge funds.
We do recommend, however, that regulators address the practical
problem that institutions' efforts to recall lent shares not infrequently
192 A modest extension, which on balance we would not adopt, would be a "vote or
explain" rule, under which institutions would have to either vote or explain why they
did not. We expect that the explanations would soon become boilerplate.
193 See Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 37 n.32 (Working
Paper, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/16th/art64; see also Bethel, Hu
& Wang (2007), supra note 191, at 14-15.
194 SeeCremers & Romano (2007), supra note 151.
195 See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones (Working Paper, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695. Soft parking may provide an alternative
explanation; if managers anticipate a close vote, they may arrange for votes to be held
by friendly hands, and then call in enough votes to win once they see how the voting is
going.
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fail. 96 Strong regulatory encouragement, and perhaps a requirement,
that institutions have the technical ability to recall shares in order to
vote would prompt technical changes in the ways shares are lent,
which would facilitate both recall and disclosure of lending activity.
At present, market participants are embedded in an overall system
in which recall is sometimes difficult. Indeed, some institutions cur-
rently do not lend shares in part because of difficulties in recalling
shares. 197 Change will take collective action, which institutional lend-
ers may not have sufficient incentives to undertake. An analogy is to
regulatory forcing of shorter share settlement periods. The regulation
should specify the minimum period needed to achieve recall. We ex-
pect that 48 hours will be enough, and 24 hours might well suffice as
the regulations develop, even if not immediately.
We also recommend that broker-dealers, who lend shares held in
margin accounts in street names, should be required to hold enough
shares on the record date so they can honor the voting instructions
they expect to receive, based on past experience with client voting in-
structions. The regulations can specify a safety margin or a maximum
acceptable probability of not honoring all instructions. For enforce-
ment, we would require broker-dealers to, first, notify their clients if
voting rights are limited because the broker lent out too many shares,
and second, publicly disclose instances in which it could not honor
voting instructions because it had lent too many shares. We would
limit this rule to shares held in individuals' and other noninstitutional
accounts. Institutional investors can fend for themselves and decide
whether and on what terms to lend their own shares. Under this ap-
proach, when broker-dealers lend shares, these shares would other-
wise likely have gone unvoted. The lent shares will often be voted by
the new holder of the shares. The overall proportion of voted shares
will rise, and the impact of rational apathy, which leads some share-
holders not to vote, will be modestly reduced.
Broker-dealers should also be required to implement internal
procedures so they know how many votes they hold, know how many
voting instructions they have received, and can reliably vote only the
shares they are entitled to vote, thus avoiding over-voting. This would
196 We discuss this and other problems associated with stock lending practices in
Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1, at 895-98.
197 In a recent survey by Institutional Shareholder Services, 31% of the institutions
who do not currently lend shares indicated that they would do so "if there were an
automated way to identify meetings for which they wanted to vote and to recall the
shares to retain voting rights." Inst'l S'holder Servs. (2007), supra note 149, at slide 3.
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apply to all the shares they hold of record, for both individuals and in-
stitutions. The regulatory push here is needed because broker-dealers
may have insufficient incentives to get this right on their own. ' 9"
If one sharply narrows the time gap between record date and
meeting date, as we recommend below, broker-dealers will receive vot-
ing instructions before the record date. They could then be required
to recall enough lent shares to honor all instructions received by a set
time before the record date, plus any instructions they expect, based
on experience, to receive between then and the record date. One
might also require them to adopt procedures to rapidly process in-
structions that come in shortly before the record date.
3. Lending to Empty Voters: Know-Your-Customer's-Purpose Rules
There are already some limits on lending for record date capture.
In the United States, Federal Reserve Board Regulation T limits the
purposes for which broker-dealers who don't deal with the general
public can lend shares. These broker-dealers must make a good faith
effort to determine the borrower's purpose and cannot lend shares for
voting purposes.'99 However, even for covered broker-dealers, Regula-
tion T would not prevent a transaction in which a client acquires votes
without economic ownership through a combined share purchase and
equity swap. Yet, as we discussed in Part I.C, this transaction is a full
substitute for a direct share loan. In the U.K., market norms also limit
record date capture. But here too, these norms apparently do not
impede the long shares, short equity swaps equivalent.' °°
198 For an extreme example where a broker-dealer routinely overvoted and appar-
ently didn't try to limit its voting based on the shares it was entitled to vote, see In re
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., NYSE Request for Review of Exchange Hearing Panel
Decision 05-45, at 2 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/05-045.pdf
(NYSE fines Deutsche Bank based on stipulated facts, including overvoting "on nu-
merous occasions").
199 See Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (2007) (defining the "exempted borrower"
exemption for major broker-dealers). For a more detailed description of Regulation
T, see Charles E. Dropkin, Developing Effective Guidelines for Managing Legal Risks-U.S.
Guidelines, in SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
167, 172-76 (FrankJ. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann eds., 2005).
200 See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND, SECURITIES BORROWING AND LENDING CODE OF
GUIDANCE § 7.4 (Dec. 2004) (stating that there is a "consensus... in the market that
securities should not be borrowed solely for the purposes of exercising the voting
rights at [a shareholder meeting]"), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
markets/gilts/stockborrowing.pdf, PAUL MYNERS, SHAREHOLDER VOTING WORKING
GROUP, REvIEw OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES 12-13 (Mar. 2005), avail-
able at http://www.investmentuk.org/press/2005/20050314-01.pdf (Myners Commit-
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We recommend expanding the reach of these rules and norms.
They should apply to all banks, broker-dealers, and other derivatives
dealers. Moreover, they should apply not only to share borrowing, but
also to matched share purchases and equity swaps, and other multi-
element transactions which are economically equivalent to share bor-
rowing. To be sure, an empty voter could likely still achieve the same
end by using different dealers for the two legs of a transaction, but this
201
would increase trading and market impact costs. Our proposed ex-
pansion of the current know-your-customer's-purpose rules will im-
pose some transaction costs and could delay some share borrowing
transactions. Yet for most of the year, borrowing for empty voting
purposes is unlikely. One might therefore want these rules to apply
primarily, or require more careful checking of the borrower's pur-
pose, during the period directly preceding a record date.
One might ask, if we bar banks, broker-dealers, and other deriva-
tives dealers from lending to empty voters, should other institutions be
subject to similar limits on lending? Our answer is no. The entities we
propose to regulate usually have little or no economic ownership of
the underlying shares and hence no reason to care how their bor-
rower votes. Other investors are usually economic owners, and could
be rationally deciding to lend their votes to others, who may be more
202informed or less conflicted voters.
Suppose that most share lenders were to recall and vote their
shares on record dates. One likely market response would be a higher
lending price for the record date. If the overnight lending price were
high enough, some lenders might then decide whether to lend or vote
depending on that price. Limited availability of borrowable shares, or
a high-enough borrowing price, would also affect many hedging
strategies, as well as short selling, which depends on the availability of
tee report, advocating greater industry safeguards to address stock lending); cf HEDGE
FUND WORKING GROUP (2007), supra note 129, at 61 (recommending a ban on voting
borrowed shares without economic interest, but not addressing the long shares, short
equity swaps equivalent).
20' As we discuss above, if an empty voter both buys shares and takes the short side
of an equity swap with a single dealer, the dealer can hedge by selling shares short to
the hedge fund; thus, there may well be no direct market impact. If the empty voter
must buy shares from one dealer and hedges with another, both sides must engage in
market transactions, incurring trading and market impact costs. The two dealers will
enter into offsetting transactions, but their actions will not be coordinated, so each
side's trades will move the market to some extent.
202 See Susan E.K. Christoffersen, Christopher C. Gczy, David K. Musto & Adam
V. Reed, Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 2897 (2007).
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borrowed shares. In theory, widespread recall of borrowed shares
could create a one-day short squeeze. Moreover, right now, the mar-
ket imposes a large cost on lenders who recall and vote shares-they
become less predictable and hence less desirable lenders. One possi-
ble solution to both problems would be to allow naked shorting, for
the record date alone, for borrowers who have already established po-
sitions (say, for a minimum number of days), so that the short seller
could simply return the borrowed shares, and reborrow right after the
record date, without having to unwind any other transactions. We
raise this as a possibility, without recommending it, because we do not
believe we understand the implications of naked shorting well
enough, and there is no immediate need for this step.03
4. Recent Changes in Share Lending Practices
Recent publicity on the role of share lending in empty voting may
be leading some lenders to voluntarily change their practices. °4 For
instance, some institutional investors are now hiring independent
monitors to try to ensure that securities loans go to "reputable, re-
sponsible borrowers," rather than to empty voters who might act
against the interests of long-term shareholders.205 These moves by in-
dividual institutions are helpful, but may have limited effect unless
they are formalized in an explicit industry self-regulatory agreement,
and address both direct lending for record date capture and indirect
equivalents. Such an expanded self-regulatory effort might gain sup-
port from the Hedge Fund Working Group report, which recom-
203 If naked shorting were to be allowed, who has voting rights-the lender who
has recalled the shares or the counterparty to whom a short seller has sold shares? The
only realistic answer is both. In an anonymous market, the counterparty cannot even
be found. This does not trouble us. Both are economic owners. Both have the right
incentives, subject to their other holdings. One loses some ex ante certainty about the
number of votable shares, but this is not a significant departure from the current envi-
ronment, when the number of shares that will be voted is unknown ex ante.
204 See Amanda Gerut, Emerging Practices in Securities Lending and Proxy Voting Nexus,
BoARDIQ Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/articles/
040307boardiq.html (quoting an industry expert as saying that "[y]ou can't ignore a
page one story in The Wall Street Journal," referring to a story by Scannell, Borrowed
Shares (2007), supra note 122, which is based on Decoupling I (Law Review Version)); cf
Inst'l S'holder Servs. (2007), supra note 149, at slide 1 ("Securities lending and the im-
pact on proxy voting policies and practices are gaining increasing exposure in the cor-
porate governance industry.").
205 Gerut (2007), supra note 204.
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mends a regulatory ban on the use of borrowed shares for empty vot-
206
ing purposes.
D. Strategies Focused on Voting Architecture
The new vote buying has put stress on a "voting architecture" de-
veloped at a time when information about the voting agenda, and the
votes themselves, were on paper, which moved slowly around a large
country long before the emergence of modern decoupling strategies.
That voting architecture is greatly complicated by the current need to
embed it within a system of record ownership of most shares, devel-
oped to facilitate share trading and payment of dividends.
It is time to rethink the voting architecture in any case to reflect
instant electronic access to the voting agenda, the potential for instant
delivery of votes, and the potential for direct voting of shares by eco-
nomic owners. The extra stress on the system due to new forms of de-
coupling might provide the impetus for that broader rethinking. We
propose below a number of reforms-some technical and narrow, oth-
ers involving major restructuring of the current architecture.
1. Technical Changes
Several technical changes to current practices would facilitate vot-
ing by economic owners. First, the voting agenda should be available
before the record date, and the record date should be publicly known
before it has passed. This will ensure that share lenders know what
they will be voting on when they decide whether to recall lent shares,
and know when they will have to recall the shares. The SEC could use
its "proxy rules" authority to require companies to announce the re-
cord date and a tentative agenda, say five business days before the re-
cord date.
Second, dividend record dates and voting record dates should be
split. Right now, many companies combine them. Some investors will
borrow shares on the dividend record date as part of a dividend cap-
ture strategy. If the two record dates coincide, the dividend capture
investor also acquires votes, yet is an empty holder who will likely not
exercise them. There is no substantive reason for the two dates to co-
incide. The SEC could use its proxy rules authority to require that the
two dates be separated, say by at least five business days.
206 HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP (2007), supra note 129, at 61.
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Third, when overvoting occurs, the record owner should be
treated as voting the number of shares it is entitled to, with yes, no,
and abstain votes reduced proportionately. The current Delaware ap-
proach, in which a million valid votes are tossed out if a record owner
reports 1,000,001 votes, has nothing to recommend it, at least nothing
we can think of. 20 7 This would require a change in Delaware case law
on how tabulators should handle overvotes, but no change in the
Delaware corporate statute, which already provides a procedure for
tabulators to reconcile overvotes. 208 The SEC could also prevent most
overvoting by requiring record owners to verify the number of shares
they are entitled to vote before voting and vote only that number of
shares, in proportion to voting instructions received.
2. Direct Voting by Economic Owners
The current voting system routes many votes by economic owners,
clumsily, with error and delay, through record owners. This is not in-
evitable. If we want to get voting right, we could greatly simplify the
current system by getting record owners out of the middle, and having
votes travel directly from economic owners to the company or to an
outside vote tabulator. We assume below that a vote tabulator receives
the votes, but the mechanics do not depend on this assumption.
This is not a new idea. Jay Brown suggested something similar in
1988, and other scholars have done so more recently.209 Russia im-
plemented a similar approach in 1995. 2 10 The Business Roundtable
207 See Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.A. Fin., Inc., 837 A.2d 21, 25-28 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(invalidating 230,000 otherwise valid votes because of a 0.3% overvote). Vote tabulators
can sometimes resolve overvotes by contacting the record owner and getting corrected
data, but this effort is sometimes not made and, even when made, sometimes fails.
208 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(d) (2001) (providing that "inspectors may con-
sider other reliable information for the limited purpose of reconciling proxies and bal-
lots" where overvoting is suspected).
209 SeeJ. Robert Brown,Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities and
Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683
(1988). For a recent return to this theme, see David Donald, The Rise and Effects of the
Indirect Holding System: How Corporate America Ceded Its Shareholders to Intermediaries
(Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017206.
210 3aion o6 aKt11onepuix o61ueCTBax PoccHiACKOi DeaIepaLH9 [Law on Joint Stock
Companies of the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 208-FZ, art. 51, Ros. gaz., Dec.
29, 1995, latest amendments published in Ros. gaz., Jan. 11, 2006; see also BERNARD S.
BLACK, REINIER KRAAKMAN & ANNA TARAssOvA, A GUIDE TO THE RussiAN LAW ON
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 325-26 (1998).
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proposed something similar in 2004.21' Any country with a single cen-
tral depository most likely has direct voting as well.21 2 It would mean
that record owners would have to tell companies who their economic
owners are. However, most major shareholders are already known
due to ownership disclosure rules. Firms know the identities of a fair
number of other shareholders under SEC "OBO/NOBO rules," which
require record owners to ask economic owners whether they object to
disclosure of their identity to companies, and to disclose the identities
of non-objectors.1 13 Shareholders who wanted to remain anonymous
could still hold through shell companies, or through nominee ac-
counts at broker-dealers.
If anonymity were a serious concern-more than we believe it to
be-companies could be required to use SEC-licensed vote tabulators,
and record owners could provide information about economic owners
only to tabulators, who would not disclose it to companies. This would
be similar to the confidential voting procedures already used by many
companies. If a company does not use a tabulator, or otherwise learns
about votes as they come in, presumably a dissident should have the
same access to this information.
Such a system is compatible with record ownership, but would be
likely to affect share lending. For example, record owners might need
to lend from identified accounts, instead of from an unidentified
pool. Or record owners would need to tell tabulators something like
"the following economic owners hold in aggregate x votable shares;
please limit their voting rights accordingly." If voting is direct, there
could be pressure to advise margin account holders if some of their
votes were not counted because the corresponding shares had been
lent; that disclosure could reduce willingness to hold shares in margin
accounts. Tracing the impact of direct voting on share lending is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
Direct voting would require changes in both SEC and stock ex-
change rules. But it is not technically difficult; indeed, it is simpler
211 See Business Roundtable, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder
Communications (Petition 4-493) (Apr. 12, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm (recommending that the SEC "consider requiring bro-
kers and banks to provide companies with contact information for all beneficial own-
ers, and permit companies to mail proxy materials directly to all beneficial owners").
See, e.g., Vladimir Atanasov, Conrad S. Ciccotello & Stanley B. Gyoshev, Learning
from the General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies: The Case of Bulgaria,
31J. CORP. L. 1003 (2006).
213 Exchange Act Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2007).
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than the current system. It builds on technology that is already in
place under the NOBO rules. Its greater simplicity should reduce the
breakdowns that plague the current system, in which valid votes are
not counted.
3. Minimizing the Gap Between Record Date and Meeting Date
For a typical firm, the time gap between the record date and the
meeting date is about a month. That time used to be needed-for
paper information about the meeting and requests for voting instruc-
tions to make their way through layers of record holders to the eco-
nomic owner and back up. Today, that delay is largely unnecessary.
Economic owners can be notified about the meeting by e-mail, obtain
information about the meeting electronically, either from the com-
pany or the record owner, and give voting instructions online. More-
over, trading velocity has increased, and consequently so has the di-
vergence between who holds shares on the record date and who still
holds them on the meeting date; today, roughly 10% of a typical firm's
shares will trade during this period.1 14 Some of these will be round-
trips, but still a significant mismatch between voting rights and eco-
nomic rights is likely. The mismatch could be higher for an important
vote, because investors will trade in anticipation of the voting out-
come. The time gap also makes possible the strategy employed in
Henderson Land, of borrowing on the record date, voting to decrease
share price, and profiting by selling short before the meeting date.
Yet it is straightforward to compress the time between record date
and meeting date. Suppose first that economic owners cast votes di-
rectly with tabulators. A shareholder could say "vote all my shares
yes," and this would simply happen. The shareholder could also split
votes by saying, for example, "vote 60% of my shares yes, 30% no, and
10% abstain." Or the shareholder could say "vote 1000 shares yes,"
and if it only holds 900 votes, then only 900 will be counted. If the
shareholder says "vote 700 shares yes and 300 shares no," but owns
only 900 shares, the tabulator would honor voting instructions pro
rata, similar to our proposal above for overvoting. Under this ap-
214 For instance, annual turnover rates on the New York Stock Exchange increased
from about 20% in 1966 to about 73% in 1987 and 88% in 2000. See Henry T.C. Hu,
New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Share-
holder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1273, 1302-03 (1991); W. Scott Bauman, Robert E. Miller
& E. Theodore Veit, Managing Portfolio Turnover: An Empirical Study, 44 Q.J. BUS. &
ECON. 15, 15 (2005).
[Vol. 156: 625
DECOUPLING H
proach, shareholders could vote before the record date, and trades
between the date they vote and the record date would not invalidate
their voting instructions. 1 5
The time gap between record date and meeting date turns on the
vote tabulator's ability to verify voting rights, and match these against
voting instructions. The tabulator will receive and verify votes as at
present, as they come in, and enter them into a computer database.
The tabulator will then receive ownership data from the firm and re-
cord holders, match the two, and report voting outcomes. In princi-
ple this could likely be done overnight, based on ownership as of the
close of the prior trading day. At least initially, it might be more prac-
tical to allow an extra business day. Thus, voting for a Wednesday
meeting would be based on ownership at Monday's close, and so on.
International comparisons suggest that this time frame is reason-
able. The U.K. has compressed the time between record date and
meeting date to two business days; Germany may effectively have a
two-business-day period as well; France has three business days; and
Spain has five days.216 A recent EU Directive contemplates member
states eliminating record dates entirely and allowing electronic voting
at meetings, as long as shareholder identities can be established. 11
215 If voting rights are limited by reference to economic ownership, then major
shareholders who voted before the record date and attested to economic ownership at
that time, would presumably need to reattest, or correct a prior attestation, as of the
record date. One form of attestation could be "I have, and at the record date will have,
economic ownership the shares for which I have voting rights," thus allowing for un-
hedged trading between the attestation date and the record date.
216 In the U.K., see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 327(2) (Eng.). German law does
not use the concept of a record date for registered shares; shareholders as of the meet-
ing date can vote. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGB1. I
at 1089, last amended by Gesetz, July 16, 2007, BGBI. I at 1330,
§ 67(2) (F.R.G.). Thus, the minimum time is set by the share trading settlement pe-
riod, currently two business days. In practice, a somewhat longer period is sometimes
needed to allow the company to update its share register. UWE HOFFER, AKTIENGESETZ
334 (7th ed. 2006). Germany also allows bearer shares; for these shares the time gap is
three weeks. Aktiengesetz § 123(3). On the French system, see Decree No. 06-1566 of
Dec. 11, 2006, Journal Officiel de la Ropublique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Dec. 12, 2006 (amending Code de Commerce art. R225-85); Jean-Paul Valuet,
Le dicret du 11 dicembre 2006 sur les sociitis commerciales, 2007 REVUE DES SOCIETES 227,
233-34. On Spain, which uses a two-level dematerialized system of shareholding with
record owners as the first level and economic owners as the second level, see Kahan &
Rock (2007), supra note 158, at 36. See also Nathan (2007), supra note 158, at 8 (pro-
posin to compress the time between record and meeting dates).
N Council Directive 2007/36, art. 7.2, 2007 O.J. (L 184/17) (EC), allows compa-
nies to dispense with a record date if they can identify shareholders on the meeting
date. Article 8.1-2 of the Directive requires companies to offer shareholders direct
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This would require amending state corporate laws to eliminate the
current minimum time gap between record date and meeting date218
(ten days in Delaware ). The company should still be required to
provide information about the voting agenda in advance of the meet-
219
ing (a ten-day minimum period seems reasonable). Under our pro-
posal, voting would largely, perhaps completely, precede the record
date. Thus, one would also need to amend state corporate law to al-
low voting instructions which do not specify the number of shares to
be voted, such as "vote all my shares yes," and to allow proportional
allocation of votes if a shareholder casts a number of votes that ex-
ceeds his actual voting rights.220
E. The Substance of Voting Procedure: Last-Minute Scrambles for Votes
Compressing the period between record date and meeting date
will have substantive implications for how proxy contests are carried
out. If the record date is established well before the meeting date,
then ownership is fixed. For a contested issue, both sides can lobby
voters, but they can no longer simply buy shares and accompanying
votes. The time for that will have passed. Under our proposal, in con-
trast, shares can be bought-and then voted-until very close to the
meeting date.
We see this as generally fine, as long as the voters are real, rather
than empty. But it could be problematic if some safeguards are not
put into place. First, insiders often have private knowledge of how the
voting is going. They should not be able to use that information to
buy just enough shares, just in time, to win a close contest. Managers
usually win the close votes already. 2 Adding last-minute share buying
to their arsenal will not improve matters. Thus, we believe that section
16(b) insiders (directors, officers, and 10% shareholders), and the
electronic voting at a meeting "subject only to such requirements and constraints as
are necessary to ensure the identification of shareholders and the security of the elec-
tronic communication."
218 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (2007).
219 This approach is consistent with the current European approach. See Council
Directive 2007/36, supra note 217, at art. 5.1 (minimum period for notice of a general
meeting, including the agenda, of either fourteen or twenty-one days).
220 We contemplate a default corporate law provision, changeable in a company's
charter, which would provide for a variety of types of voting instructions that can re-
main valid despite changes in the number of shares owned, and create procedures for
handling the most common sources of conflict between voting instructions and actual
ownership.
221 See Listokin (2007), supra note 195, at 2.
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company itself, should be barred from buying and then voting shares
during a period just preceding the record date, say five business days.
The same rules could apply to explicit outside proxy contestants.
We would still allow the contestants to urge their friends to buy
and vote shares-indeed, it is hard to see how one could prevent this.
But that raises a second risk. Buying real shares is expensive, but buy-
ing empty votes is cheap. Unless we have good rules in place to deter
empty voting, the quality of elections might decline. Thus, this pro-
posal assumes that we also implement the anti-empty-voting proposals
discussed above.
V. EXTENSIONS OF THE DECOUPLING FRAMEWORK
We briefly discuss here several implications and extensions of our
decoupling analysis: decoupling of shareholder rights and obligations
beyond voting and economic ownership rights and disclosure obliga-
tions (Section A); debt decoupling (Section B); and the potential for
return of street sweep takeover bids (Section C).222
A. Other Shareholder Rights and Obligations
1. Unbundling Shareholder Rights
In Decoupling I and in the bulk of this Article, we focused on two
shareholder rights-"economic ownership" (the right to receive the
economic return on shares) and voting rights-and one obligation-
the obligation to disclose large ownership stakes. We also did not un-
pack the components of economic ownership. But shareholders have
additional rights, large shareholders can have additional obligations,
and economic ownership can be decomposed into smaller components.
We begin here to discuss that further set of rights and obligations,
and the associated potential for unbundling. Empty voting, hidden
ownership, and morphable ownership are important uses of decoup-
ling, but they are not exclusive.
Shareholders who have full ownership of shares generally have at
least the following rights:
Sections A and B expand on related discussions in Hu, Shareholder and Creditor
Decoupling (2007), supra note 3, at 1, 4, 20-21 & 23; and Hu & Westbrook, Shareholder
and Creditor Interests (2007), supra note 3, at 1321, 1329-30, 1366, 1382-89, 1395-98,
1401-03.
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" they benefit from fiduciary duties of directors and officers,
including the understanding that directors and officers
should act in the shareholders' interest, even if sharehold-
ers have only limited ability to force this outcome, beyond
the power, flowing from voting rights, to replace direc-
223
tors;
" the right to sue, both derivatively and directly, to enforce
the fiduciary duties of directors and officers;
22 4
" the right to inspect the company's books and records;
225
* the right to present resolutions at a shareholder meeting
under state corporate law, and to include resolutions in
the company proxy statement under federal securities
law; 
226
* several rights that can be seen as components of economic
ownership:
o appraisal rights;
o rights to receive dividends;
o rights to be paid in liquidation (after everyone
else); and
o preemptive rights to acqure additional shares, in
an offering which involves preemptive rights.
227
Some of these rights are inherent in longstanding concepts of
what it means to own shares; one might call these "embedded rights."
Others are of more modern vintage. For each, one must ask: How
can this right be decoupled from others? What impact does decoup-
ling of some rights, such as decoupling of economic ownership from
voting ownership, have on other rights? Full exploration of these is-
sues is beyond the scope of this Article, but we sketch here some ele-
ments of the complex landscape.
Inspection rights. Some other rights will follow voting rights, with-
out regard to economic ownership. In Delaware, for example, the
223 See, e.g., Hu (1991), supra note 214, at 1288-1300 (proposing the concept of
shareholder "maximization rights").
224 On shareholder rights to sue for fiduciary breaches, see, for example, MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 258-75, 912-
1039 (9th ed. 2005).
25 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001).
226 See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
227 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001) (appraisal rights); id. § 170 (dividends);
id. § 271 (liquidation).
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courts have allowed "empty inspecting" of the company's books by a
person with no net economic ownership.28
Lawsuit rights under corporate law. In Delaware, for voting rights,
only formal record ownership counts. In contrast, a shareholder who
holds shares indirectly through a record owner can bring a lawsuit.
Here, economic ownership suffices. Moreover, the court will not ask
whether an apparent economic owner has hedged its position.
"Empty suing" is permitted.2
Lawsuit rights under securities law. In federal securities cases, eco-
nomic ownership suffices. A holder of equity swaps is a proper plain-
tiff in a securities class action under Exchange Act section 10(b).
2 30
Shareholder resolution rights. Under Delaware law, only shareholders
231can attend a shareholder meeting and present resolutions. How-
ever, a record owner, on request, will provide a proxy to an economic
owner who wishes to attend and present a resolution. In contrast, for
shareholder proposals included in the company proxy statement un-
der Rule 14a-8, beneficial ownership in the 13D sense counts. Under
SEC rules, persons who have filed a Form 13D, 13F, or 13G stating
their beneficial ownership can simply present a resolution; other eco-
nomic owners must provide proof of ownership, provided by the re-
232cord owner. Hedging does not affect the right to present a pro-
posal, but would likely need to be disclosed under antifraud rules.233
Appraisal rights. The recent Transkaryotic case offers a road map
for what can be termed "empty appraisal."2 3  An investor acquired
shares in the secondary market, largely after the record date for the
vote on a merger. Thus, it had not itself voted against (or not for) the
merger; nor could it show how or if these precise shares had been
voted. The shareholder argued that more shares than it held had ei-
ther not been voted, or had been voted against the merger, and the
228 Deephaven Risk Arb Trading Ltd. v. Unitedglobalcom, Inc., No. 379-N, 2005
WL 1713067 (Del. Ch.July 13, 2005).
29 Deephaven, 2005 WL 1713067. In Deephaven, a shareholder first borrowed shares
in one account, then "sold" these shares to its own account with a different dealer.
The Delaware court found that this created ownership in the second account and al-
lowed a suit to proceed.
2" Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
231 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001).
232 Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2007).
233 Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2007).
234 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
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particular shares it held therefore might meet the statutory require-
ment of not having been voted for the merger.2' 5  The Delaware
Chancery Court found that this was a sufficient basis for exercising
appraisal rights. 1 6 We focus here not on the merits of the decision,
but on a decoupling strategy that it makes possible.
Under Transkaryotic, a hedge fund can seek appraisal even if it
held neither economic nor voting ownership on the record date. It
also need not hold net economic ownership when it seeks appraisal-
nothing in the Transkaryotic decision suggests that hedging one's share
ownership would result in the loss of appraisal rights. The hedge fund
in Transkaryotic was a net economic owner, just not on the record date.
But this need not always be the case. Thus, the right to seek appraisal
potentially can be doubly empty-empty of the voting rights which
were heretofore required to be held and exercised against or not for
the deal, and potentially empty of economic ownership as well. The
court recognized that gaming opportunities were possible, but felt
that a remedy had to come from the legislature.2 7
Unbundling economic ownership. Decoupling is also possible for the
components of economic ownership. For example, strategies have
been developed to use equity derivatives to avoid the withholding tax
on dividends and, for tax-exempt entities, unrelated business income
tax. 23 Moreover, just as there are record date capture strategies to ob-
tain voting rights, there are similar capture strategies, based on own-
ing shares on dividend record dates, to obtain dividends. These strate-
gies are attractive because of tax quirks in particular countries.1
39
235 SeeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001).
26 The investor held shares through a record owner, and thus ultimately through
Cede & Co., which is the first-tier record holder for most banks and brokers. The
court limited the number of appraisable shares to the number held of record by Cede
& Co. which were voted against the merger or not voted. This is a loose limit because
Cede & Co. holds of record a large fraction of the shares in most public companies,
and a significant percentage of these will go unvoted in a typical merger.
237 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5.
23 See Anita Raghavan, Happy Returns: How Lehman Sold Plan To Sidestep Tax Man-
Hedge Funds Use Swaps To Avoid Dividend Hit; IRS Seeks Information, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
2007, at Al; Anita Raghavan, Hedge Funds Could Lose Offshore Shelter: Senate Panel Weighs
Targeting Derivatives by Change in Tax Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at Cl; Jeffrey L.
Rubinger, Tax Planning Strategies with Equity Derivatives, FLA. BARJ., Apr. 2002, at 45, 49.
239 See Chris Hughes, Dividends-The Accidental Asset Class, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 12, 2007, at 15.
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Preemptive rights can be decoupled as well; they can be acquired by
240
borrowing shares, without economic ownership.
In our view, investors' creativity in acquiring various rights-to
sue, inspect books, obtain appraisal, or exercise preemptive rights-
without economic ownership, if it becomes more than occasional, will
call for a legislative or judicial response. At a minimum, we believe
that courts should require disclosure of coupled and related non-host
assets which affect economic interest in corporate and securities law-
suits. Perhaps too, the courts should look skeptically on exercise of
rights without meaningful economic ownership, especially efforts to
exercise rights with negative net economic interest.
2. Unbundling Shareholder Obligations
We turn next from rights to obligations. In addition to ownership
disclosure, voting ownership conveys additional obligations, which can
be sidestepped by acquiring economic-only ownership. First, anyone
who crosses 10% voting ownership becomes subject to short swing
profit forfeiture under Exchange Act section 16(b). This outcome
can be avoided by holding a voting stake of less than 10%, regardless
of one's total economic ownership.
Second, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act) requires an investor which intends to purchase a
sizeable stake in another company to obtain advance clearance from
the U.S. antitrust authorities (Federal Trade Commission and De-
partment of Justice).14' An exemption lets institutional investors who
have no control intent buy up to 10% of a company's shares, regard-
less of dollar amount. 42 However, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is trig-
gered only by acquiring "voting securities";2 43 cash-settled derivatives
arguably do not count. This may let an acquirer first obtain eco-
nomic-only ownership, then seek antitrust clearance, then morph its
economic ownership into voting ownership as well.
Third, some state antitakeover statutes impose obligations or cre-
ate disabilities (such as loss of voting rights or inability to complete a
240 Deephaven Risk Arb Trading Ltd. v. Unitedglobalcom, Inc., No. 379-N, 2005
WL 1713067 (Del. Ch.July 13, 2005).
241 Clayton Act § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
242 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2007); see also Malcomb Pfunder, Shareholder Activism and the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Exemption for Acquisitions of Voting Securities Solely for the Purposes of
Investment, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 74.
243 Clayton Act § 7A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000).
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merger) if a shareholder crosses a specified ownership level.244  In
Indiana, for instance, when any person acquires either share owner-
ship or "the power to direct the exercise of voting power" beyond a
certain threshold, the shares generally lose voting rights unless the
245other shareholders vote to restore them. In Delaware, an acquirer
who crosses 15% ownership without the consent of the target board is
generally barred from completing a merger with the target for three
246
years. While there are no cases on point, it seems unlikely that cash-
settled equity derivatives would count toward the threshold. However,
given the similar voting rights-based concept underlying the Schedule
13D trigger, we suspect that most practitioners would assume that the
matched shares would generally not need to be included.
Fourth, standard poison pills are triggered by owning more than a
specified percentage of the target's shares. The definition of owner-
ship used in most pills is borrowed from Exchange Act section 13(d),
and does not capture cash-settled derivatives. To be sure, pill docu-
ments could be amended to include economic-only ownership, if
companies saw the need to do so.
A fifth avoidable obligation arises in countries with "mandatory
bid" rules, under which a shareholder who crosses a threshold for
near-controlling ownership, often 30% or 33%, must offer to buy all
remaining shares at the price paid to acquire its stake. But the
threshold is measured in terms of enforceable voting rights-the
morphable rights that often accompany economic ownership do not
count. Examples in Table 1 of the use of economic-only ownership to
avoid making a bid for all other shares include Fiat (Italy), SAI-
Fondiaria (Italy), and John Fairfax Holdings (Australia).
Shareholders may have additional obligations in particular coun-
tries, which can be avoided through decoupling. In Korea, for exam-
ple, the controlling shareholders of Hyundai Elevator wanted to hold
enough shares in Hyundai Merchant Marine (Marine) to block a
takeover bid for Marine by Hyundai Heavy Industries (controlled by a
separate branch of the Hyundai group's founding family). If it ac-
quired more shares directly, it risked being considered a "holding
247company" under Korean law, with various adverse consequences.
244 For discussion of these laws, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS § 12.12 (2002).
245 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-142-1, 23-1-42-2, 23-142-9 (West 2005).
246 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).
247 This discussion is based on a series of reports by the Korean Center for Good
Corporate Governance: Hyundai Elevator Again Enters into a Complicated Derivative Deal,
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Instead of purchasing Marine shares directly, Elevator arranged
for outside investors-Cape Fortune in 2004 and Nexgen Capital (a
subsidiary of French bank IXIS) in 2006-to hold the shares, while us-
ing equity swaps and other contracts to protect the investors against
loss, keep 80% of any gain, ensure that the investors voted as directed,
and keep the right to acquire the shares when the contract period ex-
pired. The parking in this case was "hard," because there were explicit
contracts on economic return, voting, and disposal of the shares. The
Korean Fair Trade Commission held in 2007 that Elevator's strategy
was indeed outside the Holding Company Act. Korean observers have
speculated that other firms can use similar strategies to avoid the hold-
ing company regulations.245
Similarly, in the United States, soft parking potentially provides a
way for a firm to avoid being considered to be an "investment com-
249
pany" under the Investment Company Act of 1940. An entity can
become an "inadvertent" investment company if, among other things,
it "owns... investment securities having a value exceeding [40%] of
the value of such issuer's total assets." 250 "Investment securities" in-
clude common shares in another company, but might well not include
equity swaps or other derivatives.251
ISSUE REP. (Ctr. for Good Corporate Governance, Seoul, Korea), Oct. 26, 2006; Hyun-
dai Group Avoids Being Subject to "Holding Company Regulations ": What Is Its Impact ?, ISSUE
REP. (Ctr. for Good Corporate Governance, Seoul, Korea), Sept. 19, 2007; Hyundai
Group Faces Possible Holding Company Conversion, ISSUE REP. (Ctr. for Good Corporate
Governance, Seoul, Korea), May 3, 2007.
248 Hyundai Group Avoids Being Subject to "Holding Company Regulations": What Is Its
Impact? (2007), supra note 247.
249 Investment Company Act § 3(a) (1) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1) (C) (2000); see
also Meredith M. Brown, Michael P. Harrell & William D. Regner, Internet Incubators:
How To Invest in the New Economy Without Becoming an Investment Company, 56 BUS. LAW.
273, 274 (2000);John S. Dzienkowski & RobertJ. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyerlndepend-
ence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEx. L. REV. 405, 494-95 (2002).
250 Investment Company Act § 3(a) (1) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1) (C) (2000).
251 Investment Company Act § 3(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (2) (2000). The defi-
nition of investment security depends on the definition of "security." Investment
Company Act § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2000), copies the definition of se-
curity in Securities Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000), and courts have ac-
cordingly interpreted the terms similarly. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 486
F.3d 305, 309-10 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, it is not illogical to extend the parallelism one
step further. Securities Act § 2A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b-l(b) (2000), has been
amended to state that a security "does not include any security-based swap agreement."
There was no parallel amendment to the Investment Company Act. Nonetheless, a
court might interpret the Investment Company Act definition similarly; if so, equity
swaps and perhaps other derivatives would fall outside the Investment Company Act
definition. We know of no court decisions on point.
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Sometimes, the obligation to be avoided arises under contract. In
2007, Russia's Alfa Group, which owned stakes in two competing
Ukrainian mobile telephone companies, faced an arbitration award
requiring it to cut its indirect ownership in one of them, Kyivstar, to
below 5%. It complied, or claimed to, by selling half of its stake to a
Kazakh company, but retaining the right to repurchase the shares. 52
B. Debt Decoupling and Empty Crediting
Our analytical framework for equity decoupling, including many
of its functional elements and terminology, can be extended to debt
contracts. We discuss here some forms of debt decoupling and sketch
some of their implications. Full treatment is beyond the scope of this
Article. We offer a fuller treatment elsewhere.2 2
Just as the conventional understanding of share ownership as-
sumes the bundling of a standard set of rights and obligations, so too a
traditional conception of debt ownership includes a standard package
of economic rights (principally principal and interest payments), con-
trol rights, default rights, and other rights and obligations under con-
tractual covenants, federal bankruptcy law, and, to a limited extent,
state corporate law. Just as shareholders can easily reduce or elimi-
nate their economic exposure by holding equity derivatives and other
coupled assets, creditors can often reduce or eliminate their economic
exposure through credit derivatives and other coupled assets. Credi-
tors, like shareholders, can hedge in a number of ways. Just as share-
holders can be empty voters, so too we can have "empty creditors."
And so on.
One simple way for a creditor to hedge involves a credit default
swap. The holder of the long side of a credit default swap accepts de-
fault risk from the short side. A creditor can thus hedge default risk
by holding both risky debt and an appropriate short credit default
swap position, much as a shareholder can hedge equity risk by holding
both shares and the short side of an equity swap. A creditor can also
hedge through other credit derivatives (e.g., a credit spread option
252 Alfa owned part of a Turkish cell phone company, Turkcell, which owned part
of Kyivstar. After the arbitration decision, Alfa sold half of its stake in Turkcell. See
Timofei Dzyadko, Sold to Hold, VEDOMOSTI, Dec. 4, 2007 [ToMo(Der ,lI39,UKo,
lpo~anH noaepKaTb, Ve~AoMoCTH], available at http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/
article.shtml?2007/12/04/137331; Number Portability To Stay, Says Court, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/
article.php?enewsid=90435.
253 See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling (2008), supra note 4.
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whose payoff depends on the spread between the yield on a particular
bond and a reference yield) or through strategies involving the com-
pany's shares, such as buying put options on the shares, or taking the
short side of an equity swap.
Another general strategy for debt decoupling arises from repack-
aging of debt. A "loan participation" offers a simple example: a lead
bank lends money to a corporation, but then transfers some, most, or
even all of its economic return to other lenders. Often, the lead bank
agrees to exercise its rights under the loan agreement to declare or
waive defaults, amend covenants, and so on, as instructed by the buy-
ers of the loan participations, in proportion to dollar amount owned.
But some loan participation contracts leave these control rights with
the lead bank.154 If so, the lead bank will have greater control rights
than economic exposure. Decoupling is more common if the loans or
other debt obligations are securitized into a collateralized loan obliga-
tions (CLOs) or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). A trustee
holds the formal rights as to the portfolio of debt. The terms of the
CLO or CDO may or may not give the buyers of the CLO or CDO
tranches rights to instruct the trustee on how to act. The interests of
holders of different tranches can also differ widely.255 To complicate
matters further, loan participants or CLO or CDO holders may be
fully or partly hedged, or have other interests in the company's equity
or debt.
The current housing finance crisis highlights some of the issues
arising from debt decoupling. In the past, homeowners facing finan-
cial difficulty could try to negotiate directly with lenders for waivers
and loan modifications. This is harder today. Many home mortgage
loans are resold by the initial lender, securitized, or both. If a loan
has been securitized, the effective holder of the lender's contractual
rights-the servicing agent for the loan that deals with the home-
owner-may have limited authority to make accommodations--or too
254 For a loan participation example involving decoupling of economic interest
from control rights, see AutoStyle Plastics, Inc. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In reAutoStyle Plas-
tics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 736-37 (6th Cir. 2001).
255 Repackaging can also result in conflicts of interest. For example, CDO repack-
agers sometimes retain part of the securities they create. Citibank retained $43 billion
in highly rated, senior tranches (only to later take a $10 billion write-off). Cracks in the
Edifice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2007, at 89. If Citibank retained control rights for the
underlying debt, it might face a conflict between actions that would benefit its own po-
sition and actions that would benefit more junior tranches.
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256
little economic ownership to want to do so. The economic interest
will often be spread among a wide range of investors, potentially
around the world. Even if these investors had congruent interests-
and often they do not because of the way the underlying obligations
were divided into tranches-the transaction costs simply to find them
would be prohibitive. Sometimes it can be unclear who holds the
right to foreclose.257
Beyond its implications for particular borrowers and creditors,
debt decoupling may affect the stability of the world financial system.
A potential benefit of decoupling is improved risk spreading, and thus
reduced concentration of default risk on a limited number of finan-
cial institutions. On the other hand, the resting place of risk becomes• 258
uncertain. Market participants often want to deal only with reliably
solvent counterparties. When a new source of risk emerges, if the
holders of that risk cannot be readily identified, illiquidity can spread,
and compound the losses from the initial risk event.
An additional concern is that, when debt is repackaged and re-
sold, it becomes harder to modify the initial terms of the debt contract
even when it would be efficient for both sides to do so. For any one
loan, this is an efficiency loss and no more, to be weighed against the
risk-spreading and other benefits of securitization and other forms of
decoupling. But for a zillion loans, the inflexibility of the relation-
ships among creditors and debtors creates systemic risk.
In the rest of this section, we focus more narrowly on corporate
debt and on hedging through credit default swaps and discuss some
implications of this form of debt decoupling. A creditor who has
partly or fully hedged through a credit default swap nevertheless re-
256 See Lingling Wei, Investors Look to Loan Servicers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007;
Lingling Wei, Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, Subprime Woes Weave Tangled Web, WALL
ST.J.,June 29, 2007, at C1.
257 See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 3:07CV043, 07CV085, 07CV138, 07CV237,
07CV240, 07CV246, 07CV257, 07CV286, 07CV304, 07CV312, 07CV317, 07CV343,
07CV353, 07CV360, 07CV386, 07CV389, 07CV390, and 07CV433, 2007 WL 4056586
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2007); In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532,
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920,
07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, and 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D.
Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (rejecting foreclosure claims); cf Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclo-
sures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at C1 (noting that lawyers for
troubled homeowners may use this opinion to resist foreclosures on other loans).
258 In this Article, we leave aside several other ways in which debt decoupling may
affect systemic risk, such as the impact of such decoupling on the initial credit decision
and the impact of informational asymmetries with respect to the risk/return character-
istics of the many complex securities that are often created.
[Vol. 156: 625
DECOUPLING H
tains full contractual rights under the loan agreement or bond inden-
ture, and full voting rights in bankruptcy. In contrast, the holder of
the long side of the credit default swap bears default risk, but has no
control rights. Control rights have been decoupled from economic
rights. By analogy to empty voters, we can call a creditor which has
hedged its economic risk an "empty creditor."
Just as equity investors can have negative economic ownership,
and hence incentives to vote against the interests of other sharehold-
ers, so too can creditors. Suppose, for example, that a hedge fund,
bank, or other investor holds $200 million of a company's bonds, but
is also long a $500 million notional amount in credit default swaps on
this debt. The investor has negative net economic ownership, and
thus has an incentive to act to cause the company to fail-for exam-
ple, to oppose an out-of-court restructuring-because it will profit
more from its swap position than it will lose from its bonds. Within
bankruptcy, the investor has an incentive to vote in ways that will re-
duce the value of the debt class it holds. Here too, there is a parallel
with equity investors, who can potentially hold shares yet have negative
net economic ownership.259
The complexity of multiple classes of both equity and debt offers
many possibilities for negative economic ownership. Instead of being
long credit default swaps, our example investor could be long debt
and short shares. It would then want to recover on its debt position
but want to see little or no value left over for equity holders, so as to
profit from its short position. Or, an investor could be long one class
of the company's debt, and short another. It could be long both
shares and debt, and seek to use its debt position primarily to generate
a gain on its share position. And so on.
There is also an analogy to a shareholder's economic interest be-
ing affected by its positions in other companies-which we call related
non-host assets. A creditor could hold long or short positions in the
shares or debt of the company's competitors, giving rise to complex
incentives with regard to this company's value.
259 Apart from Hu, Shareholder and Creditor Decoupling (2007), supra note 3, and Hu
& Westbrook, Shareholder and Creditor Interests (2007), supra note 3, the only academic
discussions we are aware of that consider the possibility of empty crediting and nega-
tive creditor economic ownership are short discussions in Frank Partnoy & David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1034-35
(2007), and an early stage working paper, Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen, Anti-
Bankruptcy (Working Paper, Dec. 2007) (on file with authors).
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Empty crediting can also affect creditor actions under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Suppose a creditor is fully hedged, with zero economic
interest. The Code assumes that creditors will act to further their ap-
parent economic interest, and will favor a bankruptcy filing only if they
expect to receive more in bankruptcy than in an out-of-court restructur-
ing. However, an empty creditor may prefer to force the company into
bankruptcy, rather than agree to a restructuring, because the bank-
ruptcy filing will trigger a contractual payoff on its swap position.
One important case in which "empty crediting" is rumored to be
common involves investing in the debt of financially troubled compa-
nies. When a firm gets into financial distress, specialized "distressed
debt" or "vulture" investors often accumulate large stakes in a debt
class that are likely to be pivotal in the expected restructuring. For
example, they may acquire a "blocking stake"-a position, typically
one-third of a pivotal debt class, which may let the holder block adop-
tion of a reorganization plan favored by other creditors, which ordi-
narily requires a two-thirds vote of creditors (though the judge can
still approve a plan which does not receive this level of support).2 60
Unless hedged, these large positions convey large exposure to default
risk. It is widely believed that distressed debt investors often hedge
some of this risk, thus acquiring a large voting block without corre-
sponding economic exposure.
These possibilities raise obvious questions: How common is partly
or fully empty crediting? How often do creditors have negative eco-
nomic ownership? We simply don't know. Empty crediting occasion-
ally comes to light in news stories. Bankruptcy practitioners worry
about it. 26 But there is no general requirement to disclose hedges, ei-
ther in or out of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) requires disclosures by creditors who
serve on ad hoc creditor committees of direct holdings of the com-
262pany's debt and equity. But it is unclear whether this rule requires
260 See 1 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000).
261 See, e.g., Eric B. Fisher & Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of
Corporate Bankruptcy Practice, AM. BANKR. INST.J., Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007, at 24, 24; Living
on the [H]edge: New Ethical Challenges, Panel Discussion at the 81st Annual National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges (Oct. 11, 2007) (summary paper on file with au-
thors) (stating that "[tihe presence of credit default swaps may fundamentally change
the economic interest of lenders").
262 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a) ("[E]very entity or committee representing more
than one creditor or equity security holder.., shall file a verified statement [includ-
ing] ... the amounts of claims or interests owned by... the members of the commit-
tee ... , the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other
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disclosure of hedges, such as credit default swaps, which involve hold-
ing coupled assets rather than the company's own securities. One re-
cent bankruptcy court decision requires disclosure of at least some
coupled assets; another does not.6 3 In any case, creditors can avoid
this rule in a number of ways, including not serving on ad hoc com-
mittees and, oddly, gaining membership on an official creditor com-
mittee; official committees are exempt from Rule 2019.
264
For the extreme case of creditor negative economic ownership,
one sign of smoke, which might signal an underlying fire, is the recent
tendency for credit default swap form contracts to require the long
swap holder, if it is also a creditor, to act in the interests of other
creditors. This suggests concern that the long swap holder might not
otherwise do so. But how the swap counterparty can enforce this obli-
gation, without disclosure either of hedges or of how the long swap
holder has voted on a restructuring, is anyone's guess.
We do know that the opportunity for large-scale, undisclosed
creditor hedging is present. Over the last decade, the credit default
swap market has exploded. The notional amount of swaps out-
standing often exceeds the amount of actual debt, sometimes many-
265fold. We have also heard from bankruptcy judges that they some-
times see odd behavior in their courtrooms, which "empty crediting"
might help to explain. For example, one bankruptcy judge described
a recent case wherein ajunior creditor complained of too high a valua-
tion being assigned to the bankruptcy estate, for reasons the creditor
did not offer to the judge. One possible explanation is that the junior
disposition thereof."). Common practice, however, is not to disclose purchase dates or
amounts paid. Mark Berman, Will the Sunlight of Disclosure Chill Hedge Funds?, AM.
BANKR. INST.J., May 2007, at 24, 25 n.13.
263 Compare In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dis-
closure required), with In re Scotia Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902, at
*1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 29, 2007) (disclosure not required). For discussion of the
Northwest Airlines case, see Berman (2007), supra note 262.
264 See Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Bankruptcy Rule 2019 and the Unwarranted
Attack on Hedge Funds, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2007, at 16, 16 (arguing that there is
no policy reason to require disclosure for ad hoc committees, but not official commit-
tees). In theory, a sophisticated bankruptcy trustee could condition appointment of a
creditor to an official committee on disclosure of coupled assets.
265 See Gillian Tett & Paul J. Davies, Unbound: How a Market Storm Has Seen Deriva-
tives Eclipse Corporate Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at 11 (explaining that the market
for credit default swaps is now ten times larger than the dollar amount of underlying
bonds); Richard Beales, Uncertain Road Ahead for Delphi, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 8,
2005, at 45 (describing the bankruptcy of Delphi, which had $2 billion of outstanding
bonds, but ten times that amount in outstanding credit derivatives).
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creditor had negative economic ownership of this debt class-or per-
haps of the company's shares.
Corporate debt decoupling is also possible. Most bond indentures
allow a company to hold and vote its own bonds. Even if an indenture
does not allow the company to vote its own bonds, soft and hard park-
ing offer ways to influence a vote on a restructuring proposal, in or
out of bankruptcy.
There are parallels to equity decoupling with respect to disclosure
as well. On the equity side, there is some disclosure of hedging and
thus of economic ownership."' On the credit side, there is usually
none. "Hidden creditors" can exist as well-for example, investors
who have taken the short side of credit default swaps. The extent to
which this economic-only debt ownership is likely to be morphable, if
the investor decides it wants covenant rights or voting rights in bank-
ruptcy, we do not know, but the possibility surely exists.
Just as equity decoupling can potentially undermine standard as-
sumptions that underlie the equity side of corporate governance (call
this "equity governance"), so too on the debt side (call this "debt gov-
ernance"). Both loan contracts and the Bankruptcy Code are prem-
ised on the assumption that creditors are averse to downside risk, but
otherwise have an economic interest in the company's success and will
behave accordingly. Voting in bankruptcy, in proportion to principal
amount of debt held, rests on the same logic as a one-share-one-vote
regime on the equity side-that control rights should be held by those
with an incentive to increase the value of the firm, or at least the value
of the asset class that is held. Large-scale, hidden debt decoupling
weakens our ability to rely on these assumptions. Empty crediting im-
plicates other core aspects of the bankruptcy process, including which
creditors should serve on official or ad hoc creditor committees,
whether the court should approve paying an ad hoc creditors commit-
tee's legal fees, and the weight a court should give to the views of par-
ticular creditors.
All this pushes in several directions. The first and most direct im-
plication involves disclosure. We believe that disclosure of coupled
assets should become a routine part of bankruptcy proceedings, per-
haps with an exception for de minimis hedges or general hedges tied
to an asset class, rather than a particular company's debt. Put differ-
ently, fully or partly empty creditors should disclose their "hidden non-
266 See Hu & Black, Decoupling I (Law Review Version) (2006), supra note 1; supra Part
[Vol. 156: 625
DECOUPLING II
interest": their lack of economic exposure to the company. Specifying
details of such a disclosure regime is beyond the scope of this article.
A more complex disclosure area involves knowing who holds eco-
nomic exposure to the company. This "hidden debt ownership" cor-
responds roughly to "hidden ownership" in the equity decoupling
context. Here we have, as yet, no firm recommendations to offer.
Beyond disclosure, debt contracts may need to adjust to the new
world of hedged interests, voting rights in bankruptcy may need to be
based on net economic ownership instead of gross ownership of debt,
and the extra complexities in devising sensible voting rules may pro-
vide support for proposals to rely more on auctions. Where auctions
are not available, proposals should rely less on creditor voting and
more on judicial discretion. Workout and reorganization procedures
will need to reflect a more complex world, in which we can no longer
assume that creditors want a higher recovery for their own class and,
inter-creditor conflicts aside, want a higher overall company value.
C. The Reemergence of Street Sweep Takeover Bids
For a brief time in the mid-1980s, a new form of takeover bid,
known as a street sweep, threatened to undermine U.S. takeover regu-
lation. A bidder would launch a tender offer, shares would move to
arbitrageurs, and then the bidder would drop the bid and rapidly buy
a large block of shares from the arbitrageurs in the market. Once this
technique had been tried a few times, the bidder didn't need to go
out and seek shares at all-the arbitrageurs would come to it and offer
their shares.
The culmination of the street sweep came in 1986, where Cam-
peau dropped its tender offer for Federated Stores at 8:30 a.m., and by
9:00 a.m. the Jefferies investment bank had contacted the major arbi-
trageurs, put together a 48% block of shares in Federated, negotiated
the price, and sold the block to Campeau, thus giving Campeau ma-
211jority ownership of Federated. Takeover battle over.
Bills were introduced in Congress to block street sweeps, and the
SEC introduced its own proposed anti-sweep rule. 268  Before either
body acted, street sweeps faded away, killed by a combination of poi-
267 For a discussion of this and other street sweeps, see Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise
and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202, 205-12.
268 See Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities Un-
dertaken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 24,976, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,472 (proposed Oct. 7, 1987).
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son pills, state antitakeover laws, and the need for antitrust approval
269
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act before a major acquisition. Yet,
not all states have antitakeover rules that block sweeps, not all firms
have poison pills in place, and antitrust approval can potentially be re-
ceived before a bid is launched. Moreover, while the known sweeps
relied on first making and then terminating a tender offer, it was
scarcely obvious then, and is even less likely today, that this is neces-
sary-a bidder can announce its plans to make a takeover bid, or even
privately so advise some major shareholders, and wait for an offer to
sell a block of shares to arrive.
Decoupling makes the street sweep strategy easier still. A bidder
can acquire, cross the 5% threshold for 13D disclosure, and then, dur-
ing the ten-day window before the 13D must be filed, buy up to 9.9%
of a target's shares (stopping short of the 10% level that would trigger
short-swing profit forfeiture under Exchange Act section 16) and then
use decoupling strategies to jump to a much higher level, perhaps to
effective control. A bidder can borrow a block of shares while hedg-
ing, and then later release the hedge. Or it can acquire a large long
equity swap position, and then unwind the swap to obtain shares. The
key to both of these strategies is that they rely only on borrowing and a
private transaction between a dealer or dealers and the bidder; they
do not require market purchases and hence do not directly alert mar-
ket participants or move market prices. Based on the facts available to
us, the confidential case noted in Table 1 involves this fact pattern; it
escaped publicity because the target was small.
If a bidder combines hedged purchases, with little or no market
impact, with purchases from hedge funds, who often invest in parallel
(the unkind term is "wolf pack"),27 ° the first public announcement of
Bidder's interest could be that Bidder has economic ownership, and
possibly voting ownership, of a majority of Target's shares. Several of
the European takeover examples in Table 1 involve sudden emer-
gence of a bidder with close to effective control of the target, includ-
ing Scor-Converium, Vekselberg group-Sulzer, and Victory-Saurer. A
variant on this theme is Laxey-Implenia, where Laxey acquired a 23%
stake, which market participants understand is for sale at the right
price to a takeover bidder. That bidder could potentially acquire 20-
269 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
270 See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., For Hedge Funds, Hunting in Packs Pays Dividends:
Financier Hohn Sparks Battle for ABN Amro, Gets Help from Allies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
2007, at Al.
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30%, then jump to a control position by buying Laxey's stake, all be-
fore any public disclosure.
Exchange Act section 16(b) does not block these strategies. It ap-
plies only once a shareholder already has 10% voting ownership, and
thus it does not apply to shares acquired in a transaction in which a
shareholder jumps from just under 10% to way over it. Nor does it
reach shareholders who hold a 9.9% voting stake and the rest through
long equity swaps.
A firm with a poison pill in place is still partly protected, and the
pill could be amended to provide reasonably complete protection. Yet
we scarcely want defense against a sneak takeover attack to require
that every public company have a pill in place. The need for antitrust
approval before turning economic ownership into voting ownership is
a further obstacle to a street sweep. Still, the potential remains.
The right regulatory response is not obvious, and is beyond the
scope of this Article. We observe here only that street sweeps are back
today in Europe, and could appear tomorrow in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The concept that shareholders hold economic, voting, and other
fights as well as disclosure and other obligations as an integrated
whole is central to legal, regulatory, and economic understandings of
the public corporation. This presumed coupling ensures that share-
holders have an incentive to exercise voting rights to increase share
value. The primary shareholder voting, corporate control market, dis-
closure, and other legal and market oversight mechanisms on which
we rely to regulate public firms and their shareholders, and to con-
strain and incentivize managers to act in the interests of shareholder-
owners, presume this coupling.
A similar assumption underlies the contractual and regulatory
treatment of creditors. This coupling ensures that creditors have an
incentive to exercise their contractual and bankruptcy rights well,
which reduces the expected costs of financial distress. The presumed
coupling of these rights and obligations pervades contracting practice,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Bankruptcy Code.
Yet on both the equity and the debt side, these couplings are in-
creasingly optional. On the equity side, shareholders can now readily
decouple economic from voting rights, resulting in such patterns as
empty voting, hidden ownership, morphable ownership, and empty
appraisal. Corporations as well as shareholders can play the decoup-
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ling game. On the debt side too, the unbundling of rights and disclo-
sure obligations poses new and important challenges, both for indi-
vidual creditors and debtors and perhaps for the financial system as a
whole.
In this Article, we have concentrated on equity decoupling, and
do so for the balance of the Conclusion. In Decoupling I, we examined
the decoupling by shareholders of voting rights from economic own-
ership, and the associated potential for empty voting and hidden
(morphable) ownership. In this Article, we treat these as specific ex-
amples of a broader concept of equity decoupling. We show how
other standard shareholder rights and obligations can be delinked as
well and offer illustrative examples.
We extend the concept of equity decoupling to decoupling by the
corporation itself. A corporation cannot vote its own shares, but it can
often do so in practice by "soft parking" shares in the friendly hands of
derivatives dealers or other third parties.
We also provide evidence that equity decoupling has become an
important worldwide phenomenon. We offer dramatic new examples,
involving sneak decoupling-based takeover attacks on major firms,
where a raider acquires a controlling or near-controlling stake prior to
any public disclosure. In Switzerland, a series of these takeovers led to
public outcry and a regulatory response. We can expect a similar out-
cry here if-perhaps when-similar examples emerge. It is appropri-
ate to regulate now, because waiting for a crisis could lead to overreac-
tion. We expand our prior integrated ownership disclosure proposal
to cover corporate decoupling and better address share lending, and
discuss recent U.K. evidence suggesting that our disclosure proposal is
likely to yield valuable information without imposing large burdens on
investors.
We also present a number of specific proposals that go beyond
disclosure and respond to empty voting. These include providing
constrained corporate power to limit the voting fights of empty voters,
reconfiguring the relationships among annual meeting dates and vot-
ing and record dates, and encouraging institutional investors to recall
and vote lent shares.
Finally, we discuss several implications and extensions of our ana-
lytical framework. We extend the concept of equity decoupling to in-
clude a full set of share-related rights and obligations. We extend the
concept of decoupling to include debt decoupling. And we discuss how
decoupling can contribute to the return of "street sweep" takeovers.
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U.S. observers who continue to see equity decoupling as a curiosity
of no current urgency would do well to look abroad. They also need
to appreciate that a decade ago no one thought that debt decoupling
raised serious public policy concerns. The benefits of debt decoup-
ling were clear, but some important costs were not. As the front-page
events that unfolded in mid-2007 have now made clear, debt decoup-
ling has affected world economies in complex and important ways.
Equity decoupling may have the same potential. Regulators elsewhere
are responding: indeed, some major hedge funds have now called for
regulatory responses to address hidden ownership and empty voting.
The development of large-scale equity decoupling is still fairly
new. Its extent is only partly known. Its benefits and costs are largely
unknown. We have therefore offered measured, cost-sensitive re-
sponses. We offer a simple, low-cost proposal for integrated owner-
ship disclosure. This proposal will not prevent empty voting, but will
likely reduce its extent. Our principal substantive proposal is for con-
strained corporate self-help--corporations can amend their charters
to address empty voting, while being constrained not to use this new
power in ways that are likely to entrench insiders. If, once disclosure
reforms are in place, the level of empty voting is low, many corpora-
tions may do nothing. If they do something, they are unlikely to do
much harm to share values. We propose reforms to encourage institu-
tions to vote shares rather than lend them on record dates, but would
not force them to do so.
Equity decoupling has benefits, and quite possibly larger benefits
than costs, if one takes into account the value of hedging and short
selling, which both involve decoupling. But equity decoupling is oc-
curring against the background of a corporate governance paradigm
and legal rules which largely assume that shareholders have coupled
rights and obligations. Innovation now allows the decomposition of
what seemed elemental. The granularity of analysis and regulation
must change accordingly. A new set of possibilities and risks is emerg-
ing. It is appropriate to take measured steps to address those risks.
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